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Abstract
This dissertation investigates female career progress in the U. S. federal government in
aspects of wage, promotion, leave, and fertility. It sheds lights on how women face trade-offs
between career and fertility and how the gender decomposition of supervisors affects gender wage
and promotion gaps.
The first chapter examines how female leadership affects the gender wage gap in the U.
S. federal government. Using a unique dataset from the Office of Personnel Management, I track
careers of civilian employees from 1988 to 2011. I find that in offices where all supervisors are
men, male wages are on average 10.6% higher than female wages. In contrast, in offices where
all supervisors are women, the wage gap in favor of men disappears and becomes 3.2% in favor
of women due to a 7.1% increase in female wages and a 6.7% decline in male wages. Also, the
gender of an executive (a higher level supervisor) has a lesser impact on wages than the gender
of regular supervisors. However, the gender of an executive has a greater impact on wages of
supervisors than on wages of non-supervisors, which is consistent with the theory of mentorship.
I account for potential endogeneity caused by a non-random assignment of supervisors by using
office fixed effects and an instrumental variable based on retirement. Finally, I investigate potential
mechanisms by examining promotions, exits, starting, and exiting positions.
The second chapter examines the effects of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) on the
promotion of women into managerial positions using the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
data and imputed fertility rates from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) data. I find
that after the FMLA was passed in 1993, there was a significant change in the relationship between
fertility and promotion, with fertility becoming more negatively associated with promotion. Com-
pared to the relationship prior to 1993, a 10% increase in fertility is associated with an additional
1.3% decline in the probability of being promoted. This suggests that the FMLA may have inhibited
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the relative career progress of women in high-fertility demographic groups in the U.S. federal civil
service system.
The third chapter examines the effect of Medicaid expansion on the fertility rate using
individual level panel data under an alternative insurance. We find that without controlling for
an alternative insurance, Medicaid eligibility expansion has no significant effect on female fertility.
However, we find that for those females not covered by insurance, Medicaid eligibility increases
fertility by 5 percentage points per year over time. Such effect is both statistical and economically
significant and is stronger among groups of females that are un-married or not employed. These
evidence suggests that Medicaid program as a social benefit is more effective for those who need it
the most.
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Chapter 1
Women Working for Women: Career
Advancement and the Gender Wage
Gap in the U. S. Federal Government
Summary This paper investigates how female leadership affects the gender wage gap in the U. S. fed-
eral government. Using a unique dataset from the Office of Personnel Management, I track careers of civilian
employees from 1988 to 2011. I find that in offices where all supervisors are men, male wages are on average
10.6% higher than female wages. In contrast, in offices where all supervisors are women, the wage gap in
favor of men disappears and becomes 3.2% in favor of women due to a 7.1% increase in female wages and a
6.7% decline in male wages. Also, the gender of an executive (a higher level supervisor) has a lesser impact
on wages than the gender of regular supervisors. However, the gender of an executive has a greater impact
on wages of supervisors than on wages of non-supervisors, which is consistent with the theory of mentorship.
I account for potential endogeneity caused by a non-random assignment of supervisors by using office fixed
effects and an instrumental variable based on retirement. Finally, I investigate potential mechanisms by ex-
amining promotions, exits, starting, and exiting positions.1
Keywords: Female leadership, wage gap, instrumental variables, mentorship
JEL Classification: J16, J31
1Parts of this research were supported by National Science Foundation grant #ACI-14-43014.
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1.1 Introduction
A persistent, though shrinking, gender wage gap2 has been documented by a large litera-
ture in labor economics. According to the study in Blau and Kahn (2016a), women in the private
sector earned 8.4% less than men in 2010,3 controlling for differences in individual and occupa-
tional characteristics, and are less represented among upper-level executive positions4. Although
the U. S. federal government is considered less discriminatory than the private sector, Bolton and
de Figueiredo (2017) record that men are paid significantly more than women in the federal gov-
ernment. Specifically, after controlling for human capital and other factors they show that the wage
gap in the public sector decreased from 6.5% in 1988 to 4.9% in 2011. During the same period, I find
that the percentage of supervisors who are female increased from 27% to 42% in the public sector.
Could the greater representation of women in supervisory and executive positions contribute to
the reduction in the wage and promotion gaps in the U. S. federal government? The answer to this
question has important policy implications such as if the wage gap could be reduced by imposing
gender quotas on leadership.
This study uses a massive dataset from the United States Office of Personnel Management
(OPM), which follows over three million civilian federal government employees over a 24-year pe-
riod, to answer the question whether female leadership helps to reduce wage and promotion gaps
in federal government offices. I find that female leadership significantly increases female workers’
wages, while simultaneously decreasing male workers’ wages, thereby reducing the gender wage
gap. In particular, moving an office from all male to all female leadership increases next period
female workers’ wages in real terms by 7.1%, decreases male workers’ wages by 6.7%, thereby
reducing the gender pay gap from 10.6% into a reverse gender gap of 3.2%. In this estimation, I
control for human capital, race, tenure, occupation category and other fixed effects. To account for
the endogeneity possibly caused by the non-random assignments of supervisors to offices, I include
office fixed effects into the analysis and I build an instrumental variable based on retirement.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to analyze how female leadership in-
2The gender wage gap is defined as the average yearly earnings of men minus that of women.
3Women also suffer more when it comes to bad firm performances. For example, female executives are more exposed to
bad firm performances according to Albanesi, Olivetti, and Prados (2015); Asch, Haider, and Zissimopoulos (2005); Belley,
Havet, and Lacroix (2015), and female workers suffer larger losses when displaced due to plant closure according to Tate
and Yang (2015).
4For example, only 6% of U. S. corporate chief executive officers (CEO) and top executive positions were women in 2010
(Matsa and Miller (2011)).
2
fluences the gender pay gap in the U. S. federal government. The related literature focuses on
the private sector. I show that female supervisors and executives reduce gender wage gap in the
federal government. Moreover, the existing literature on the direction and the significance of the
relationship between the gender wage gap and the gender of the supervisor is inconclusive. While
some studies also found that female leadership reduces the wages gap, others found an opposite
effect or no effect. For example, Gagliarducci and Paserman (2015), using German industry data,
document that the share of females in the top management has an insignificant effect on both male
and female wages. In contrast, Cohen and Huffman (2007), using a dataset drawn from the U. S.
2000 Census, find that increased representation of women in management decreases the gender pay
gap. However, Maume and Ruppanner (2015), using the American National Study of the Changing
Workforce, show that both women and men under a female supervisor earn lower wages on aver-
age compared to having a male supervisor. Penner, Toro-Tulla, and Huffman (2012), using private
data from an American grocery retailer, find that the gender of the immediate manager has no effect
on male and female wages. Bell (2005), using Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp, finds that female
executives in female-led firms earn 15%-20% higher compensation than women in other firms, and
male executives under a female CEO earn less compensation than men in male-led firms.
One of the advantages of the data I use is that I observe the entire population of civil-
ian federal employees from 1988 to 2011. While the related studies use not an entire sample but
subsamples to answer how the gender of an executive or supervisors affects the male and female
wages, this study conducts the initial analysis based on the 10-percent subsample and then com-
pares the results to the findings from the full sample. I show that the magnitudes from the above
results are quite different due to the attenuation bias in the small sample. For example, in the 10-
percent sample, the female leadership has no effect on male and female promotions; while using
the entire sample, I find that females are more likely to be promoted under female supervisors
than under male supervisors. Since previous studies used different data and different data have
different attenuation biases, it could be one of the reasons why the literature does not agree.
By utilizing the structure of the OPM dataset, in particular, that it follows careers of all em-
ployees from 2008-2011, I furthermore contribute to the literature by explaining the mechanisms
through which female leadership affects female wages. Previous studies, using various country
data and various private industry data, once again provide mixed results. For example, Bell, Smith,
Smith, Verner, et al. (2008), using Danish firm-level data, find that women in women-led firms have
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a higher probability of promotion, while the percentage of female directors have no effect on pro-
motions of men. However, Maume (2011), using the American National Study of the Changing
Workforce data, finds that a female supervisor has a negative impact on female advancement op-
portunity and positive impact on male advancement opportunity. Blau and DeVaro (2007), by
using American Multi-City of Urban Inequality employer survey, find that the gender of an im-
mediate supervisor has no effect on both male and female promotions. Finally, Giuliano, Leonard,
and Levine (2005) using data from a large U. S. retail employer, find employees with different-sex
managers have on average 3-5% higher quit rates, 3-8% higher dismissal rates, and 8-11% lower
promotion rates. By using the full-time employees, I find that under female leadership, females
are more likely to be ever promoted from a non-supervisory position to a supervisory position. By
restricting the sample to the employees on the General Schedule pay, I find that under female lead-
ership female are more likely to start on a higher grade-step position than under male leadership
and more likely to be promoted to a higher grade. Also, under female leadership, male employees
have higher propensity to exit the job than under male leadership and the effect is not significant
for females.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 3.2 presents the OPM data and dis-
cusses the variables construction methods; section 3.3 discusses the benchmark model, explores
various approaches to tackle the potential endogeneity, and establishes the main results that fe-
male leadership increases female pay and decreases male pay, thereby reduces the gender wage gap
in the government sector; section 3.4 investigates further the channels through which the female
leadership impacts workers’ wages by exploring the effect on workers’ career mobility; section 3.5
discusses the potential theoretical explanation for this empirical result; section 3.6 is a robustness
check and section 1.7 concludes. Additional tables are included in the Appendix.
1.2 Data and Variables
1.2.1 Data
In this paper, I use the restricted dataset from the United States Office of Personnel Man-
agement (OPM). According to Bolton and de Figueiredo (2017), this dataset covers personal records
of all non-department-of-defense employees by the U. S. federal government over a 24-year period
4
of 1988-2011. This dataset is the largest of its kind and has a considerably larger scope than any
other public release from the OPM. There are over three million unique full-time, non-seasonal
employees in over 20 million observations in the data. Since the data is both cross-sectional and
longitudinal, at one-year intervals, it allows the researcher to link individuals and their career pro-
gressions over time to examine the effect of the gender of executives and supervisors on the wage
gap. It contains information on employee careers such wages, work schedules, awards earned,
supervisory status, occupation, and their individual characteristics such as gender, race, age, edu-
cational background, geographic location, etc. With this dataset, I can focus the empirical analysis
in granular detail without concerns about sampling errors. I am also able to generate substan-
tially more power from the statistical tests and conduct analyses which are difficult to assess with
substantially smaller datasets.
1.2.2 Variables Construction
In this study, I set the unit of a workplace to be an office. It is defined and uniquely deter-
mined as a duty station (location) for a given government agency. For example, the Social Security
Administration office in Boston, MA and the Social Security Administration office in Clemson, SC
are considered two different offices. Examples of offices are shown in Exhibit 1.1 below.
The main variable of interest is logPayi,t, the natural log real wage of an employee infla-
tion adjusted to September 2011 dollars. I multiply the logPayi,t by 100 to enable a convenient
coefficient interpretation as percentage changes.
The main independent variable of interest is the female leadership, it is aimed to measure
the individual-specific female leadership in the office that excludes double-counting. Specifically,
I construct variable FSupi,j,t−1, the individual-specific current office’s fraction of supervisors who
are female in the previous period, excluding the impact of him/herself if counted. This construction
is to account for the fact that a person’s employment conditions like wage and promotion of a
given year t are determined in the previous year t − 1. The relevant circumstances that affect the
employment contract should be based on the current office’s previous year status. For example,
if an individual i is now at office j, i’s wage is determined by office j’s status at year t − 1. If
i is counted in the fraction of female supervisors, then i will be subtracted from this calculation.
Furthermore, I construct the variable FExeci,j,t−1. Similar to the construction of the FSupi,j,t−1, it
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computes the individual-specific fraction of executives who are female, excluding the impact of
the individual. An individual is considered an executive if his/her basic pay is the highest among
supervisors.
Aside from measuring period-by-period female leadership associated with each individ-
ual, I also compute a measure of female leadership exposure, a historical average over time of fe-
male leadership experienced by a particular individual, excluding double-counting. FSupHisti,j,t−1
is the individual-specific historical average of corresponding female supervisors up to time t − 1.
This measures a person’s past female supervisors that he/she has experienced. FExecHisti,j,t−1 is
similar to the construction of the FSupHisti,j,t−1, the historical average of corresponding female
executive leadership up to time t− 1.
To facilitate econometric analysis robust to potential endogeneity, I construct an instrumen-
tal variables, using retirement as exogenous instrument5. Among the retiring leaders, I compute the
relative fraction of male versus females. Since their leadership will disappear from the sample in
the following year due to retirement, this fraction will not be subject to potential endogeneity con-
cerns that may affect the next period outcome. The instrument is FSupIVj,t−1, the fraction of male
minus female among supervisors who are retiring in an office. For offices with no retiring supervi-
sors, the value of the instrument is filled with population-wide average of 0.33. Corresponding to
the female executive leadership, the instrument is FExecIVj,t−1 which is a fraction of male minus
female among executives who are retiring in an office. For offices with no retiring executives, the
value of the instrument is filled with population-wide average of 0.64.
Next, I construct individual characteristics relating to human capital to serve as control
variables. Variable Agei,t is the approximate age. Since the OPM dataset censors the potentially
identifying information, including the actual age, the approximate age will be the actual age plus a
random noise. Variable Tenurei,t is the number of years a person has been working in the federal
government.
Further, I construct a list of variables reflecting a person’s career mobility. Promotion,
Promi,t, is an indicator variable that is 1 if a person i is promoted in year t. Since in the gov-
ernment sector, the occurrences of promotion follow specific rules, I further compute a measure of
5To construct the instrument, I follow the eligibility requirement in the OPM website, https://www.opm.gov/
retirement-services/fers-information/eligibility/. I first compute the minimum retirement age (MRA) based on
the Age variable, and then I combine it with tenure requirement to calculate whether a person is eligible to retire in the
coming year. Further, I restrict the actual retirement to the condition that a person is eligible to retire and is leaving the
dataset in the following year.
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promotion that marks an employee becoming a supervisor, PromSupi,t. It is an indicator variable
that is 1 if a person i has ever been promoted from a non-supervisory status into a supervisory
position in the past. To study an employee’s propensity to exit the government sector, I also com-
pute variable Exiti,t, the indicator variable that is 1 if a person i left the government sector in year t
not due to retirement. Since about 70% of employees are on the General Pay schedule, their pay is
determined according to the pay grade and pay step. For these employees on the General Schedule
pay, I construct the variable GradeStepi,t, the grade-step of a person i ranging from 10 to 159 sim-
ilar to Bolton and de Figueiredo (2017), where each change in the last digit represents a step rate
change while a change in the second digit represents a pay grade change. To record an employee’s
starting and exiting pay status, I construct the variables GradeStepStarti,t, the pay grade step of a
person i when initially appeared in the data and variable GradeStepExiti,t, the pay grade step of a
person i when last appeared in the data.
1.2.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics of the primary variable of interest, basic pay (wage)
in 2011 dollars, by different categories, including gender, education, race, occupation, and office
size. From the result, it is evident that the unconditional gender wage gap is significant, at about
$17,000 per year in 2011 terms. Across the education categories, one can see that government
employees with a professional degree receive the most compensation, followed by a Ph.D. and an
Advanced Degree, with the lowest being a High School
degree, earning less than a half of what the professional degree employees earn. The pay by race
also confirms the literature that Asian and White are among the top racial groups in earnings,
while Black and American Indian are among the bottom racial groups in earnings. In terms of
the occupation category, the table also replicates the results reported in Bolton and de Figueiredo
(2017) that administrative and professional categories are among the highest earning occupation
categories in the government sector. Finally, in terms of the office size breakdown, no significant
differences are reported.6
Table 1.2 reports the major variables that will be used in the analysis, including their mean,
standard deviation, minimum, median, and maximum.
6In the empirical study, I drop the observations when, on average, an office had less than 3 people over the period it
appeared in the data. These tiny offices are problematic as there is no reliable way to precisely identify the effects from the
small number of people. Figure A.1 and A.2 reports the relative frequency of offices less than 5 people, and above 5 people.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of Basic Pay, by Categories
Category Avg. Basic Pay Std. Dev. Basic Pay # Obs.
Sexi
Male $74, 839 $35, 025 717, 306
Female $57, 750 $26, 989 813, 747
Educi
H.S. $49, 078 $21, 858 334, 305
<Bachelor $53, 372 $23, 585 490, 278
Bachelor $72, 467 $26, 772 328, 289
Master $84, 189 $28, 557 226, 067
Professional $118, 344 $41, 826 68, 851
Advanced $98, 148 $31, 353 2, 338
PhD $101, 805 $30, 343 58, 072
Racei
Amer. Indian $50, 534 $24, 518 38, 597
Asian $76, 971 $35, 138 61, 848
Black $52, 979 $24, 242 333, 355
Hispanic $58, 890 $29, 791 76, 189
Other $56, 047 $37, 241 63, 635
White $71, 286 $32, 683 957, 429
Occui
Admin. $79, 559 $27, 050 476, 767
Blue Coll. $45, 240 $15, 590 110, 350
Clerical $33, 670 $7, 161 171, 603
Other $32, 838 $9, 755 7812
Professional $86, 746 $32, 051 440, 968
Technical $41, 607 $11, 166 323, 461
Office Size
Tiny [0,25%] $65, 718 $29, 589 382, 765
Small (25%,50%] $66, 137 $32, 242 383, 530
Large (50%,75%] $62, 046 $33, 019 379, 925
Huge (75%,100%] $69, 077 $33, 291 384, 833
10% data, Offices with less than 3 employees are dropped.
Figure 1.2 reports the representation of female among executives/supervisors over time.
We observe a significant increase in female executives/supervisors representation over time. How-
ever, the female representation is significantly lower among the executives than among the super-
visors.
Figure 1.3 reports the female representation among different occupation categories over
time. An immediate result from this figure shows that occupation categories are highly “gendered”,
i.e. there exist strong differentials in gender diversity across different categories. For example, blue
collar is considered a mostly male category, while clerical is considered mostly a female category.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of Major Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max
Year 1999 7.06 1988 1999 2011
Real Basic Pay $64,628 $31,187 $0 $57,936 $1,548,281
Age 44.8 10.7 15 45 77
MidAge 44.7 10.9 17 47 77
Male 0.48 0.49 0 0 1
log(Pay) 1096.8 46.45 272.04 1096.71 1425.26
Ten 14.6 10.1 0 14 65
TenSq 317 354 0 196 4225
FSup 0.3754 0.2095 0 0.3939 1
FExec 0.2100 0.3790 0 0 1
FSupHist 0.3535 0.2004 0 0.375 1
FExecHist 0.1876 0.2612 0 0.0625 1
FSupIV 0.3282 0.4958 -1 0.3283 1
FExecIV 0.6398 0.2532 -1 0.6398 1
Step 4.37 2.98 0 4 9
GradeStep 98.37 33.83 10 103 159
Grade 9.39 3.34 1 10 18
Prom 17.53 38.02 0 0 100
PromSup 20.9 40.6 0 0 100
GradeStepStart 84.3 35.2 10 79 159
GradeStepExit 106 33 10 116 159
Exit 6.8 25 0 0 100
100% data, Offices with less than 3 employees are dropped.
Such trend can be seen directly from the figure.
Over the years, the real wage in the government sector has experienced a significant in-
crease, both in terms of basic pay or adjusted pay as in Figure 1.4. It is also shown that in the year
of 2008 there is a drop in all government workers’ pay.
Figure 1.5 shows that as age increases, the median real wage increases for male workers
but decreases when female workers are around 52 years old, after which female compensation is
lower for female workers with higher age. Similarly for tenure, in Figure 1.6 as tenure increases, the
median real wage increases for male workers but decreases when female workers reach 39 years
tenure, after which female compensation is lower for female workers with higher tenure.
9
1.3 Female Leadership and Wage
I first establish the main result that female leadership increases female workers wage, de-
creases male workers pay, and reduces the gender gap in the government sector. I design the
following benchmark model with the office fixed effects and the individual fixed effects based on
the Mincer equation.
1.3.1 Benchmark
To establish the benchmark model and examine the overall gender wage gap, I use the
following office level fixed effect panel regression specification to explain the wage of a government
employee:
logPayi,t = α+ β1FLeadi,j,t−1 + β2FLeadi,j,t−1Malei + β3Malei
+ γ1Agei,t−1 + γ2Tenurei,t−1 + γ3Tenure
2
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∑
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e
i,t−1 +
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θyd
y
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∑
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θjd
j
i,t + i,t, (1.1)
where the coefficient β1 indicates the effect of female leadership on female employees’ wages. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the office level.
To better control for the unobserved individual heterogeneity that could potentially impact
the coefficients of interest, I also estimate the following individual fixed effect panel regression
specification to explain the wage of a government employee:
logPayi,t = α+ β1FLeadi,j,t−1 + β2FLeadi,j,t−1Malei + γ2Tenurei,t−1 + γ3Tenure
2
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e
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m
i,t−1 +
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θyd
y
i,t +
∑
i
θidi + i,t, (1.2)
where the coefficient β1 indicate the effect of female leadership on female employee wages.
Table 3.3 reports the results when I use FSupi,j,t−1 as the measure for FLeadi,j,t−1. It shows
that female leadership significantly increases female wages, decreases male wages, and reduces the
overall gender gap. Specifically, when the female supervisors are all female compared with all male,
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Table 1.3: Female Supervisors & log(Basic Pay), All Service Status, 100% Data
(1) (2) Office Size Quartile
Office FE Ind. FE Size (1) Size (2) Size (3) Size (4)
(β1)FSupi,j,t−1 7.053
∗∗∗ 2.513∗∗∗ 3.864∗∗∗ 8.050∗∗∗ 11.83∗∗∗ 15.13∗∗
(0.417) (0.0590) (0.178) (1.092) (2.250) (6.615)
(β2)FSupi,j,t−1 × Malei -13.83∗∗∗ -1.963∗∗∗ -7.072∗∗∗ -17.47∗∗∗ -19.50∗∗∗ -21.12∗∗∗
(0.626) (0.0889) (0.254) (1.043) (2.636) (3.364)
(β3)Malei 10.63∗∗∗ — 9.717∗∗∗ 12.62∗∗∗ 12.38∗∗∗ 13.93∗∗∗
(0.305) — (0.132) (0.443) (1.160) (1.591)
(γ1)Agei,t−1 0.268
∗∗∗ — 0.219∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗
(0.0117) — (0.00687) (0.0129) (0.0188) (0.0369)
(γ2)Tenurei,t−1 1.686∗∗∗ 1.412∗∗∗ 2.000∗∗∗ 1.788∗∗∗ 1.472∗∗∗ 1.673∗∗∗
(0.0238) (0.00810) (0.0154) (0.0311) (0.0316) (0.0746)
(γ3)Tenure2i,t−1 -0.0203∗∗∗ -0.0317∗∗∗ -0.0245∗∗∗ -0.0215∗∗∗ -0.0174∗∗∗ -0.0212∗∗∗
(0.000585) (0.0000941) (0.000360) (0.000703) (0.000700) (0.00190)
p(β1 + β2 = 0) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0021 0.3790
p(β2 + β3 = 0) 0.0000 — 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004
R2Adj 0.720 0.709 0.712 0.711 0.751 0.730
#Obs 15,746,338 15,746,338 3,848,257 3,949,523 3,938,562 4,009,996
Ind. FE — X — — — —
Office FE X — X X X X
Race, OccGrp FE X — X X X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X X X X X
100% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clustered at the office level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
the female wages increase by 7% while male wages decrease by 6.8%, the gender wage gap drops
from 10.63% in favor of men to -3.2% in favor of women. These results are all highly statistically
significant. Similar significant effect, but in a smaller magnitude, is also observed at the individual
level, where female leadership increases female workers wages.
Next, I use FExeci,j,t−1 as the measure for FLeadi,j,t−1, and report the results in Table 3.4.
Compared to the effect of the female supervisors, the female executive’s impact on worker’s wage
is smaller in magnitude and is most significant at small office sizes. For example, overall, when
an office is lead by a female executive rather than a male executive, female workers’ wages will
increase on average by 0.67%. The executive’s effect is the strongest at the smallest, Size (1), and
smaller, Size (2), offices which amounts to 1.96% and 0.63% respectively. This effect is statistically
insignificant at larger, Size (3) and the largest, Size (4) offices.
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Table 1.4: Female Executives & log(Basic Pay), All Service Status, 100% Data
(1) (2) Office Size Quartile
Office FE Ind. FE Size (1) Size (2) Size (3) Size (4)
(β1)FExeci,j,t−1 0.667∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 1.955∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗ 0.450 0.324
(0.154) (0.0144) (0.114) (0.206) (0.285) (0.397)
(β2)FExeci,j,t−1 × Malei -1.979∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗ -4.207∗∗∗ -1.799∗∗∗ -0.957∗∗ -1.046∗
(0.225) (0.0221) (0.154) (0.339) (0.454) (0.565)
(β3)Malei 5.712∗∗∗ — 8.413∗∗∗ 6.532∗∗∗ 4.187∗∗∗ 5.140∗∗∗
(0.226) — (0.111) (0.240) (0.328) (0.672)
(γ1)Agei,t−1 0.269
∗∗∗ — 0.219∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗
(0.0116) — (0.00684) (0.0129) (0.0189) (0.0366)
(γ2)Tenurei,t−1 1.690∗∗∗ 1.415∗∗∗ 2.005∗∗∗ 1.792∗∗∗ 1.470∗∗∗ 1.668∗∗∗
(0.0239) (0.00806) (0.0153) (0.0311) (0.0319) (0.0763)
(γ3)Tenure2i,t−1 -0.0204∗∗∗ -0.0318∗∗∗ -0.0251∗∗∗ -0.0216∗∗∗ -0.0173∗∗∗ -0.0210∗∗∗
(0.000587) (0.0000942) (0.000358) (0.000701) (0.000708) (0.00194)
p(β1 + β2 = 0) 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.148 0.120
p(β2 + β3 = 0) 0.0000 — 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2Adj 0.719 0.709 0.711 0.710 0.750 0.729
#Obs 15,691,416 15,691,416 3,803,200 3,942,227 3,936,604 4,009,385
Ind. FE — X — — — —
Office FE X — X X X X
Race, OccGrp FE X — X X X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X X X X X
100% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clustered at the office level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
1.3.2 Instrumental Variables Approach
To guard against the potential endogeneity, I further employ an instrumental variable ap-
proach to study the effect of female leadership on employees’ wages. The instrument I chose
is based on the retirement. I assume that retirement affects next period employees’ wages only
through changing gender decomposition in the leadership positions. The construction of the in-
strument is detailed in the previous section.
Using the fraction of male among retiring leaders minus the fraction of female among re-
tiring leaders as an instrumental variable, I study the effect of female leadership using Two Stage
Least Square (2SLS) approach. The first stage involves predicting female leadership using the in-
strumental variables. Then, I estimate the following equations (1.3) and (1.4) to obtain the predicted
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Table 1.5: Instrumented Female Supervisors, First Stage, 100% Data
(1) (2)
FSupi,j,t−1 FSupi,j,t−1 × Malei
(δ1)FSupIVi,j,t−1 -0.0221
∗∗∗ 0.0553∗∗∗
(0.000920) (0.00266)
(δ2)FSupIVi,j,t−1 × Malei -0.00117∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗
(0.000398) (0.00629)
(δ3)Malei -0.000722∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗
(0.000169) (0.00462)
(δ4)Agei,t−1 -0.0000176 -0.0000417
∗∗
(0.0000155) (0.0000189)
(δ5)Tenurei,t−1 -0.000333∗∗∗ -0.000299∗∗∗
(0.0000539) (0.0000517)
(δ6)Tenure2i,t−1 0.00000660∗∗∗ -0.00000379∗∗∗
(0.00000129) (0.00000138)
R2Adj 0.153 0.787
#Obs 15,750,921 15,750,921
F-stat 56.63 834.4
Joint p 0.0000 0.0000
Office FE X X
Race, OccGrp FE X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X
100% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clus-
tered at the office level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
explanatory variables that are potentially endogenous:
FLeadi,j,t−1 = δ0 + δ1IVi,j,t−1 + δ2IVi,j,t−1Malei + δ3Malei
+ δ4Agei,t + δ5Tenurei,t−1 + δ6Tenure
2
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Table 1.6: Instrumented Female Supervisors & log(Basic Pay), Second Stage, 100% Data
(1) (2) Office Size Quartile
Office FE Ind. FE Size (1) Size (2) Size (3) Size (4)
(β1)F̂Supi,j,t−1 11.33
∗∗∗ 7.696∗∗∗ 5.145∗∗∗ 7.657∗∗∗ 5.503∗∗∗ 15.23∗∗∗
(0.541) (0.226) (0.529) (1.150) (1.347) (1.789)
(β2) ̂FSupi,j,t−1 × Malei -18.55
∗∗∗ -6.607∗∗∗ -6.433∗∗∗ -17.84∗∗∗ -20.12∗∗∗ -20.02∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.290) (0.377) (0.294) (0.354) (0.2 10)
(β3)Malei 12.44∗∗∗ — 9.532∗∗∗ 12.76∗∗∗ 12.64∗∗∗ 13.47∗∗∗
(0.0548) — (0.114) (0.110) (0.154) (0.0929)
(γ1)Agei,t−1 0.267
∗∗∗ — 0.219∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗
(0.00220) — (0.00392) (0.00437) (0.00446) (0.00452)
(γ2)Tenurei,t−1 1.686∗∗∗ 1.414∗∗∗ 2.001∗∗∗ 1.788∗∗∗ 1.471∗∗∗ 1.673∗∗∗
(0.00203) (0.00274) (0.00380) (0.00409) (0.00400) (0.00411)
(γ3)Tenure2i,t−1 -0.0204∗∗∗ -0.0317∗∗∗ -0.0245∗∗∗ -0.0215∗∗∗ -0.0174∗∗∗ -0.0212∗∗∗
(0.0000553) (0.0000335) (0.000102) (0.000111) (0.000112) (0.000111)
p(β1 + β2 = 0) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0251 0.0000 0.0000 0.0065
p(β2 + β3 = 0) 0.0000 — 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
#Obs 15,746,338 15,746,338 3,848,257 3,949,523 3,938,562 4,009,996
Ind. FE — X — — — —
Office FE X — X X X X
Race, OccGrp FE X — X X X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X X X X X
100% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clustered at the office level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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The second stage regresses the response variables of interest on the predicted female lead-
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ership variables as follows:
logPayi,t = α+ β1F̂Leadi,j,t−1 + β2 ̂FLeadi,j,t−1Malei + β3Malei
+ γ1Agei,t−1 + γ2Tenurei,t−1 + γ3Tenure
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Table 3.5 reports the first stage regression where predicted values of FSupi,j,t−1 and FSupi,j,t−1Malei
are computed. The retirement instrument is highly relevant since the F-statistics well exceeds a typ-
ical threshold of ten for the joint model significance.
Next, I report the second stage estimation results in Table 3.6. Compared with the bench-
mark case, the coefficients qualitatively do not change; however, the effect of female leadership is
stronger. Overall, purely female supervisory leadership increases female wages by 11.3% and re-
duces male worker’s wages by 6.2% comparing to purely male leadership. The gender gap under
all female supervisors is statistically significant and is - 6.1% , a reverse gender gap is observed. It
means women are earning more than men under purely female leadership. This results based on
the instrumental variable approach are significant and further corroborate with the previous results
using individual-specific female leadership.
1.4 Female Leadership and Career Mobility
After observing the statistically and economically significant effect of female leadership
on employees’ wages in the previous sections, I further investigate through what channels these
results take place. By analyzing a propensity to promote or to exit, and starting or exiting positions,
I find that under female leadership, female employees have higher propensity to be promoted,
a higher starting position and a higher exiting position than under male leadership. For male
employees, female leadership decreases their chances to be promoted and increases their chances
to exit an office and have lower exiting positions.
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1.4.1 Female Leadership and Promotion
I use the following office level fixed effect panel regression specification to investigate
whether the female leadership affects employee propensity to promote:
{PromSupi,t,Promi,t} = α+ β1FLeadi,j,t−1 + β2FLeadi,j,t−1Malei + β3Malei
+ γ1Agei,t−1 + γ2Tenurei,t−1 + γ3Tenure
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Similarly, I also estimate the individual fixed effect panel regression specification to better
control for the unobserved individual heterogeneity that could potentially impact the coefficients
of interest in the following equation:
{PromSupi,t,Promi,t} = α+ β1FLeadi,j,t−1 + β2FLeadi,j,t−1Malei
+ γ2Tenurei,t−1 + γ3Tenure2i,t−1
+
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θidi + i,t. (1.7)
Table 1.7 reports the effect of female supervisor leadership on the propensity to ever be
promoted into a supervisory status from a non-supervisory position. Under female leadership,
female workers have a 4.8% higher chance on average to ever be promoted into a supervisory
position from a non-supervisory position. At the same time, male workers have are 1% less likely
to ever be promoted into a supervisory position, the p-value of this estimate is 0.01%. Moreover,
under female leadership, the gender promotion gap decreases statistically significantly from 4% to
-1.6% compared to under male leadership.
Similar results are obtained if the explanatory variable is replaced by the propensity to be
promoted to the next grade. Table 3.9 shows that under female leadership, female employees are
1% chance more likely to be promoted based on pay grade, and for male employees, about 1% less
likely than under male leadership. The promotion gap almost disappears once the office switches
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Table 1.7: Female Supervisors & Propensity to Promote Into Supervisory Status, 100% Data
(1) (2) Office Size Quartile
Office FE Ind. FE Size (1) Size (2) Size (3) Size (4)
(β1)FSupi,j,t−1 4.854
∗∗∗ 1.513∗∗∗ 3.746∗∗∗ 6.108∗∗∗ 9.567∗∗∗ 29.89∗∗∗
(0.337) (0.143) (0.243) (0.950) (2.256) (5.588)
(β2)FSupi,j,t−1 × Malei -5.808∗∗∗ 2.729∗∗∗ -7.156∗∗∗ -3.436∗∗∗ -4.371∗∗ -6.291∗∗∗
(0.426) (0.231) (0.341) (0.871) (1.930) (2.049)
(β3)Malei 4.196∗∗∗ — 4.570∗∗∗ 3.149∗∗∗ 3.130∗∗∗ 4.662∗∗∗
(0.203) — (0.172) (0.398) (0.937) (0.978)
(γ1)Agei,t−1 -0.138
∗∗∗ — -0.172∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗
(0.00526) — (0.00888) (0.0101) (0.0105) (0.0125)
(γ2)Tenurei,t−1 1.340∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗ 1.463∗∗∗ 1.411∗∗∗ 1.142∗∗∗ 1.376∗∗∗
(0.0278) (0.0127) (0.0205) (0.0313) (0.0412) (0.0841)
(γ3)Tenure2i,t−1 -0.0203∗∗∗ -0.00677∗∗∗ -0.0208∗∗∗ -0.0203∗∗∗ -0.0178∗∗∗ -0.0225∗∗∗
(0.000700) (0.000217) (0.000591) (0.000848) (0.00111) (0.00196)
p(β1 + β2 = 0) 0.0111 0 0 0.00846 0.0147 0.0000
p(β2 + β3 = 0) 0 — 0 0.594 0.229 0.158
R2Adj 0.0958 0.133 0.107 0.100 0.0929 0.0888
#Obs 14,066,540 14,066,540 3,389,924 3,487,597 3,564,246 3,624,773
Ind. FE — X — — — —
Office FE X — X X X X
Race, OccGrp FE X — X X X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X X X X X
100% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clustered at the office level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
from male leadership to female leadership. It is worth noting that the promotion is more significant
at the smaller offices, which supports the conjecture that there may exist a radius of the effect of
female leadership. This effect is stronger in smaller offices where employees are closer to the female
leaders. I further detail on this in later sections.
1.4.2 Female Leadership and Exiting
Aside from studying the effect of female leadership on promotion, I also investigate how
female leadership affects employees’ propensity to exit an office. I find that for female workers,
female leadership has no significant effect on their propensity to exit; however, for male work-
ers, female leadership increases the propensity to exit by 0.4%, a statistically significant increase
compared to under male leadership. This helps to explain why female leadership significantly
decreases male workers’ wages by increasing their propensity to exit.
I estimate the following regression specification controlling for grade and step fixed effect
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Table 1.8: Female Supervisors & Propensity to Promote on Pay Grade, 100% Data
(1) (2) Office Size Quartile
Office FE Ind. FE Size (1) Size (2) Size (3) Size (4)
(β1)FSupi,j,t−1 0.976
∗∗∗ 2.309∗∗∗ 1.179∗∗∗ 2.596∗∗ -2.495 1.758
(0.326) (0.158) (0.216) (1.208) (2.497) (6.361)
(β2)FSupi,j,t−1 × Malei -1.915∗∗∗ -1.894∗∗∗ -2.766∗∗∗ -1.868∗∗∗ 1.548 -4.163∗∗∗
(0.279) (0.228) (0.208) (0.579) (1.158) (1.352)
(β3)Malei 1.434∗∗∗ — 3.013∗∗∗ 1.242∗∗∗ -0.347 2.115∗∗∗
(0.137) — (0.101) (0.249) (0.556) (0.753)
(γ1)Agei,t−1 -0.333
∗∗∗ — -0.277∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ -0.329∗∗∗ -0.367∗∗∗
(0.00736) — (0.00934) (0.0107) (0.0146) (0.0202)
(γ2)Tenurei,t−1 -0.929∗∗∗ 0.0170 -0.939∗∗∗ -1.047∗∗∗ -0.731∗∗∗ -0.960∗∗∗
(0.0353) (0.0188) (0.0166) (0.0325) (0.0460) (0.102)
(γ3)Tenure2i,t−1 0.0204∗∗∗ -0.00720∗∗∗ 0.0228∗∗∗ 0.0228∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗ 0.0193∗∗∗
(0.000845) (0.000218) (0.000388) (0.000752) (0.00105) (0.00242)
p(β1 + β2 = 0) 0.00360 0.0145 0.0000 0.555 0.726 0.689
p(β2 + β3 = 0) 0.0103 — 0.104 0.0848 0.0554 0.00285
R2Adj 0.172 0.222 0.190 0.187 0.152 0.172
#Obs 11,279,131 112,79,131 2,986,201 2,854,929 2,592,393 2,845,608
Ind. FE — X — — — —
Office FE X — X X X X
Race, OccGrp FE X — X X X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X X X X X
Grade FE X X X X X X
Step FE X X X X X X
100% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clustered at the office level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
and report the result in Table 1.9:
Exiti,t = α+ β1FLeadi,j,t + β2FLeadi,j,tMalei + β3Malei
+ γ1Agei,t + γ2Tenurei,t + γ3Tenure
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1.4.3 Female Leadership and Starting Position
Female leadership also impacts the starting position of a new employee. Under female
leadership, female employees start one step higher than under male employee; while for a male
employee, female leadership causes a 2.7 step decline in starting grade-step. The gender gap in
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Table 1.9: Female Supervisors & Propensity to Exit, 100% Data
(1) Office Size Quartile
Office FE Size (1) Size (2) Size (3) Size (4)
(β1)FSupi,j,t−1 0.949 0.131 0.500 -0.0347 25.22
(0.757) (0.101) (0.483) (0.844) (20.64)
(β2)FSupi,j,t−1 × Malei 0.432∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗ 1.211∗∗∗ -0.358
(0.152) (0.109) (0.220) (0.415) (0.615)
(β3)Malei 0.0574 0.0821∗ 0.150∗ -0.267 0.253
(0.0632) (0.0466) (0.0883) (0.189) (0.301)
(γ1)Agei,t−1 0.181
∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.00635) (0.00555) (0.00708) (0.00907) (0.0171)
(γ2)Tenurei,t−1 -0.688∗∗∗ -0.676∗∗∗ -0.696∗∗∗ -0.695∗∗∗ -0.653∗∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0101) (0.0157) (0.0186) (0.0287)
(γ3)Tenure2i,t−1 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.0233∗∗∗ 0.0231∗∗∗ 0.0228∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗
(0.000339) (0.000288) (0.000409) (0.000562) (0.000815)
p(β1 + β2 = 0) 0.0337 0.0000 0.0177 0.170 0.221
p(β2 + β3 = 0) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.753
R2Adj 0.0552 0.0653 0.0553 0.0509 0.0554
#Obs 12,433,292 3,260,132 3,156,277 2,876,962 3,139,921
Office FE X X X X X
Race, OccGrp FE X X X X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X X X X
Grade FE X X X X X
Step FE X X X X X
100% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clustered at the office
level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
terms of starting grade-step is reduced from 5.6 steps under male leadership to 2.9 steps under
female leadership while it still remains statistically significant from zero.
I estimate the following regression using starting grade-step as the dependent variable and
report the results in Table 1.10:
GradeStepStarti,t = α+ β1FLeadi,j,t−1 + β2FLeadi,j,t−1Malei + β3Malei
+ γ1Agei,t−1 + γ2Tenurei,t−1 + γ3Tenure
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Table 1.10: Female Supervisors & Starting Grade-Step, All Service Status, 10% Data
(1) Office Size Quartile
10% Sample Size (1) Size (2) Size (3) Size (4)
(β1)FSupi,j,t−1 1.050 0.441 0.162 3.572
∗ 11.47∗∗∗
(0.639) (0.748) (1.561) (2.131) (3.721)
(β2)FSupi,j,t−1 × Malei -2.724∗∗∗ -1.306 -4.472∗∗∗ -5.021∗ -6.082
(0.688) (0.812) (1.582) (2.795) (3.737)
(β3)Malei 5.646∗∗∗ 6.479∗∗∗ 5.954∗∗∗ 5.016∗∗∗ 6.185∗∗∗
(0.353) (0.438) (0.879) (1.252) (1.880)
(γ1)Agei,t−1 0.224
∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗
(0.0349) (0.0556) (0.0665) (0.0766) (0.0786)
(γ2)Tenurei,t−1 0.732∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗∗ 0.813∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗
(0.0417) (0.0607) (0.0811) (0.0922) (0.133)
(γ3)Tenure2i,t−1 -0.00280∗∗ -0.00325∗ -0.00282 -0.00512∗ -0.00102
(0.00122) (0.00174) (0.00241) (0.00295) (0.00407)
p(β1 + β2 = 0) 0.0123 0.255 0.0134 0.594 0.223
p(β2 + β3 = 0) 0.0000 0.0000 0.155 0.998 0.959
R2Adj 0.627 0.591 0.643 0.666 0.655
#Obs 51,915 24,319 11,500 8,755 7,341
Office FE X X X X X
Race, OccGrp FE X X X X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X X X X
10% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clustered at the office level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
1.4.4 Female Leadership and Exiting Position
Similar to a starting position, I also estimate the impact of female leadership on an exiting
position. This aims to uncover whether female leadership helps to retain female employees and
therefore contributes to the outcome of the increasing female wages. The findings are exactly the
case. Female leadership increases female workers’ exiting pay grade-step by 2.5 steps. Given that
in the government sector, promotion happens at a close to a deterministic pace, a higher exiting pay
grade-step contributes to the observed increase in female workers’ wage under female leadership.
At the same time, female leadership significantly lowers the male exiting grade step by three steps.
Combined with the previous findings that male workers start at a higher position, have higher
chances to exit and have a lower exiting grade-step, this indicates that female leadership increases
the turnover of male employees. This result is consistent with my findings that female leadership
significantly decreases male wages.
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Table 1.11: Female Supervisors & Exiting Grade-Step, All Service Status, 10% Data
(1) Office Size Quartile
All Sizes Size (1) Size (2) Size (3) Size (4)
(β1)FSupi,j,t−1 2.480
∗∗∗ 2.130∗∗∗ 2.769∗∗∗ 1.963∗ 6.853∗∗
(0.445) (0.548) (0.873) (1.183) (3.228)
(β2)FSupi,j,t−1 × Malei -5.528∗∗∗ -5.213∗∗∗ -4.580∗∗∗ -4.252∗∗ -7.665∗∗∗
(0.530) (0.617) (1.041) (1.681) (2.719)
(β3)Malei 4.590∗∗∗ 5.614∗∗∗ 3.685∗∗∗ 3.389∗∗∗ 5.661∗∗∗
(0.294) (0.342) (0.547) (0.918) (1.409)
(γ1)Agei,t−1 0.110
∗∗∗ 0.0748 0.0570 0.125∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(0.0264) (0.0493) (0.0469) (0.0428) (0.0631)
(γ2)Tenurei,t−1 0.945∗∗∗ 1.118∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 1.008∗∗∗
(0.0264) (0.0463) (0.0404) (0.0415) (0.0692)
(γ3)Tenure2i,t−1 -0.0101∗∗∗ -0.0128∗∗∗ -0.00905∗∗∗ -0.00686∗∗∗ -0.0120∗∗∗
(0.000616) (0.00106) (0.000974) (0.000942) (0.00158)
p(β1 + β2 = 0) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0928 0.186 0.840
p(β2 + β3 = 0) 0.00243 0.370 0.149 0.314 0.151
R2Adj 0.769 0.758 0.782 0.780 0.766
#Obs 83,260 21,997 20,399 20,087 20,777
Office FE X X X X X
Race, OccGrp FE X X X X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X X X X
10% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clustered at the office level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
1.5 The Effective Radius of Female Leadership
In this section, I discuss the findings that female leadership seems to exhibit a limited ra-
dius of the effect on an employee’s career outcome. I further provide a potential link of this pattern
to the theoretical model of mentorship.
1.5.1 Female Leadership Has Limited Effective Radius
I first document the pattern of the radius of the effect of female leadership. I explore the two
dimensions of the variation: the size of the office and the ranking of employees. I find that female
leadership is mostly effective at influencing employees’ wage and promotion outcomes when the
office size is smaller, and when the ranking of the employee is closer to that of the female leader.
Table 1.12 reports the effect of the female executive leadership on workers who are of a
supervisory status, across different office sizes. Table 1.13 reports the effect of the female executive
leadership on workers who are of a non-supervisory status.
Several observations can be made: first, the female executive’s impact is stronger at offices
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Table 1.12: Female Executives & log(Basic Pay), Supervisors, 100% Data
(1) (2) Office Size Quartile
Office FE Ind. FE Size (1) Size (2) Size (3) Size (4)
(β1)FExeci,j,t−1 1.300∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 6.399∗∗∗ 1.184∗∗∗ -0.0415 -0.765
(0.264) (0.0361) (0.218) (0.263) (0.364) (0.585)
(β2)FExeci,j,t−1 × Malei -3.076∗∗∗ -0.653∗∗∗ -9.998∗∗∗ -2.375∗∗∗ -0.579 -0.0191
(0.226) (0.0467) (0.268) (0.319) (0.423) (0.434)
(β3)Malei 6.305∗∗∗ — 9.067∗∗∗ 5.840∗∗∗ 5.386∗∗∗ 5.203∗∗∗
(0.147) — (0.160) (0.197) (0.263) (0.413)
(γ1)Agei,t−1 0.410
∗∗∗ — 0.330∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗
(0.0158) — (0.0135) (0.0197) (0.0257) (0.0469)
(γ2)Tenurei,t−1 0.664∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗ 0.990∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗∗
(0.0329) (0.0175) (0.0324) (0.0438) (0.0653) (0.0772)
(γ3)Tenure2i,t−1 -0.00178∗∗∗ -0.0201∗∗∗ -0.00611∗∗∗ -0.00118 -0.00212∗ -0.000320
(0.000564) (0.000245) (0.000687) (0.000882) (0.00128) (0.00130)
p(β1 + β2 = 0) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0241 0.247
p(β2 + β3 = 0) 0.0000 — 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2Adj 0.542 0.688 0.472 0.507 0.600 0.604
#Obs 2,539,298 2,539,298 686,916 687,322 566,450 598,610
Ind. FE — X — — — —
Office FE X — X X X X
Race, OccGrp FE X — X X X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X X X X X
100% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clustered at the office level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
that are smaller in size, as indicated by the magnitude and the statistical significance change as
one moves to larger offices. This pattern holds true for both samples of supervisors and non-
supervisors. Second, comparing the effect of female executives on supervisors, who have a higher
pay scale ranking than non-supervisors, the effect on supervisors is uniformly stronger than that
on non-supervisors. Third, the effect of female executives on employees is generally weaker than
that of the female supervisors. These three patterns not only hold true for the coefficient β1, but
also for β2 and β3.
When an office is smaller, or when the employee has a higher ranking, or when the leader
is ranked closer to the employee, the distance between female leadership is naturally smaller com-
pared to the situation when the office is larger, or when the employee has low service status rank-
ings, or the leader is ranked high and is located far from the employee. These findings suggest that
female leadership may have an aura with a limited radius that affects the employee career outcome.
This pattern of limited radius not only applies to wage regressions, but also applies when
the propensity to promote is in question. Similar pattern is observed in Table 1.14 and Table 1.15.
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Table 1.13: Female Executives & log(Basic Pay), Non-Supervisors, 100% Data
(1) (2) Office Size Quartile
Office FE Ind. FE Size (1) Size (2) Size (3) Size (4)
(β1)FExeci,j,t−1 0.390∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗ 0.374 0.497
(0.141) (0.0146) (0.107) (0.209) (0.292) (0.360)
(β2)FExeci,j,t−1 × Malei -1.321∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -1.587∗∗∗ -1.505∗∗∗ -0.981∗∗ -1.058∗
(0.222) (0.0236) (0.154) (0.358) (0.452) (0.559)
(β3)Malei 4.312∗∗∗ — 6.344∗∗∗ 5.334∗∗∗ 3.075∗∗∗ 4.009∗∗∗
(0.239) — (0.116) (0.263) (0.335) (0.697)
(γ1)Agei,t−1 0.262
∗∗∗ — 0.215∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗
(0.0105) — (0.00633) (0.0116) (0.0175) (0.0323)
(γ2)Tenurei,t−1 1.638∗∗∗ 1.454∗∗∗ 1.985∗∗∗ 1.733∗∗∗ 1.434∗∗∗ 1.584∗∗∗
(0.0228) (0.00848) (0.0145) (0.0308) (0.0317) (0.0701)
(γ3)Tenure2i,t−1 -0.0229∗∗∗ -0.0341∗∗∗ -0.0289∗∗∗ -0.0244∗∗∗ -0.0196∗∗∗ -0.0223∗∗∗
(0.000550) (0.000101) (0.000348) (0.000711) (0.000716) (0.00176)
p(β1 + β2 = 0) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0968 0.228
p(β2 + β3 = 0) 0.0000 — 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2Adj 0.726 0.704 0.719 0.718 0.755 0.734
#Obs 13,152,118 13,152,118 3,116,284 3,254,905 3,370,154 3,410,775
Ind. FE — X — — — —
Office FE X — X X X X
Race, OccGrp FE X — X X X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X X X X X
100% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clustered at the office level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
In smaller offices the effect of female leadership is stronger and female supervisors have a stronger
effect on workers career outcome than the female executive leadership.
1.5.2 A Potential Mentorship Story
In the related literature that studies the impact of female leadership on employee career
outcome, there are three mutually exclusive theories that are currently being actively explored in
empirical studies, namely (1) statistical-based discrimination, (2) taste-based discrimination, and
(3) gender complementarity.
The statistical-based discrimination theory originates from the model of Phelps (1972). Tak-
ing the recent study of Flabbi, Macis, Moro, and Schivardi (2016) as an example, the basic frame-
work is the following: there are two types of jobs (complex task and simple task) and two types of
leaders (male and female). The leader assigns workers to jobs and wages based on a noisy signal of
workers’ ability. If the leaders are better at reading productivity signals of workers from the same
gender, then compared with a male leader, who cannot accurately differentiate productive and un-
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Table 1.14: Female Executives & Propensity to Promote Into Supervisory Status, 100% Data
(1) (2) Office Size Quartile
Office FE Ind. FE Size (1) Size (2) Size (3) Size (4)
(β1)FExeci,j,t−1 0.402∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 1.313∗∗∗ -0.252 0.333∗ 0.0897
(0.108) (0.0330) (0.148) (0.181) (0.175) (0.270)
(β2)FExeci,j,t−1 × Malei -0.393∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ -1.876∗∗∗ 0.987∗∗∗ 0.198 -0.713
(0.172) (0.0551) (0.233) (0.279) (0.305) (0.496)
(β3)Malei 2.009∗∗∗ — 2.760∗∗∗ 1.680∗∗∗ 1.189∗∗∗ 2.114∗∗∗
(0.117) — (0.146) (0.184) (0.221) (0.327)
(γ1)Agei,t−1 -0.136
∗∗∗ — -0.167∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗
(0.00523) — (0.00881) (0.0101) (0.0105) (0.0122)
(γ2)Tenurei,t−1 1.329∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 1.427∗∗∗ 1.403∗∗∗ 1.138∗∗∗ 1.364∗∗∗
(0.0278) (0.0126) (0.0204) (0.0312) (0.0411) (0.0839)
(γ3)Tenure2i,t−1 -0.0202∗∗∗ -0.00676∗∗∗ -0.0207∗∗∗ -0.0202∗∗∗ -0.0177∗∗∗ -0.0222∗∗∗
(0.000699) (0.000216) (0.000585) (0.000844) (0.00111) (0.00196)
p(β1 + β2 = 0) 0.947 0.0000 0.0024 0.00221 0.0464 0.104
p(β2 + β3 = 0) 0.0000 — 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00707
R2Adj 0.0939 0.131 0.101 0.0997 0.0925 0.0881
#Obs 14,045,092 14,045,092 3,371,062 3,485,689 3,563,700 3,624,641
Ind. FE — X — — — —
Office FE X — X X X X
Race, OccGrp FE X — X X X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X X X X X
100% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clustered at the office level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
productive female workers, a female leader will be able to assign productive female workers to
higher wages and unproductive female workers to lower wages. This causes the empirical results
that female executives increase female worker wages at the top, but the reverse is observed at the
bottom of the wage distribution.
In a separate strand of literature, the taste-based discrimination theory is based on the
model of Becker (1971). The employers discrimination towards an employee is purely taste-based,
for instance, based on the employee’s gender, rather than performance driven. In this setup, the
employer receives a dis-utility from employing workers of the opposite gender. As a direct result,
male executives pay women less than they pay equally productive men. Similarly, female execu-
tives will engage in a symmetric behavior against men. The result is that a gender wage gap exists,
and such gap is a homogeneous gender gap that does not depend on the productivity and other
metrics7.
7Additional related theoretical works for private firms include Black (1995); Rose´n (2003), and empirical works include
Charles and Guryan (2008); Flabbi (2010).
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Table 1.15: Female Executives & Propensity to Promote on Pay Grade, 100% Data
(1) (2) Office Size Quartile
Office FE Ind. FE Size (1) Size (2) Size (3) Size (4)
(β1)FExeci,j,t−1 0.255 0.322∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗ 0.193 -0.350 0.449
(0. 186) (0.0449) (0. 147) (0.238) (0.244) (0.569)
(β2)FExeci,j,t−1 × Malei -0.354∗∗ -0.368∗∗∗ -1215∗∗∗ 0.0256 -0.0782 -0.366
(0.148) (0.0684) (0.141) (0.181) (0.240) (0.488)
(β3)Malei 0.759∗∗∗ — 2.457∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.345
(0.0901) — (0.0816) (0.113) (0.131) (0.283)
(γ1)Agei,t−1 -0.333
∗∗∗ — -0277∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ -0.329∗∗∗ -0.367∗∗∗
(0.00737) — (0.00940) (0.0108) (0.0146) (0.0203)
(γ2)Tenurei,t−1 -0.929∗∗∗ 0.0183 -0.939∗∗∗ -1.048∗∗∗ -0.730∗∗∗ -0.964∗∗∗
(0.0353) (0.0188) (0.0167) (0.0326) (0.0460) (0.103)
(γ3)Tenure2i,t−1 0.0204∗∗∗ -0.00726∗∗∗ 0.0228∗∗∗ 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗ 0.0194∗∗∗
(0.000844) (0.000219) (0.000390) (0.000755) (0.00105) (0.00245)
p(β1 + β2 = 0) 0.483 0.367 0.0000 0.333 0.0825 0.821
p(β2 + β3 = 0) 0.0054 — 0.0000 0.0006 0.204 0.966
R2Adj 0.172 0.222 0.190 0.187 0.152 0.172
#Obs 11,253,610 11,253,610 2,962,367 2,853,477 2,592,224 2,845,542
Ind. FE — X — — — —
Office FE X — X X X X
Race, OccGrp FE X — X X X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X X X X X
Grade FE X X X X X X
Step FE X X X X X X
100% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clustered at the office level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
In addition to the first two theories, there is another separate set of literature that focuses
on the complementarities that could affect career outcome of different gender differently. An ex-
ample is the mentoring story mentioned by Athey, Avery, and Zemsky (2000). A leader can mentor
workers of lower rank and increases the productivities of the workers in contact (an executive has
an ”aura” that covers a limited number of people). Assuming mentoring is more effective if a leader
and an employee are of the same gender, then workers who are closer to the executives will receive
more mentoring opportunity than workers who are less closer to the executives. Thus, one should
expect that for female workers who are at the higher-end of the wage distribution, and for the fe-
male workers who are in a smaller office, the effect of female leadership on their wages should be
stronger.
From the empirical evidence shown in the previous sections (that the effect of female lead-
ership is stronger when the office is smaller, or when the employee ranking is higher and closer to
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that of the leaders, or when the leader’s ranking is lower and closer to that of the employee), the
theoretical model that is consistent with the empirical evidence is the third model that the female
leader mentors female workers in contact, thus, these female workers experience the increase in
wage, increase in promotion and stay longer in the tenure. Although there is no conclusive ev-
idence to prove the mentorship theory, its theoretical prediction is the most consistent with the
empirical observation.
1.6 Robustness Checks
In this study, I employ a variety of robustness checks to validate the empirical findings. For
example, I substitute the measurement of female leadership with the historical average of female
leadership experienced by a particular person, excluding the impact of him/herself. The result of
this historical female leadership is qualitatively the same and quantitatively similar to the tables
shown above. I include these results in Tables A.5 and A.6.
Further, I vary the sample of employee status in the wage regression to ensure that not a
particular class of employees is driving the results. Specifically, I investigate how female leadership
affects non-supervisors and supervisors separately. Again the results are qualitatively the same and
quantitatively similar. The corresponding effects are reported in Tables A.3 and A.4.
Moreover, I report the result not only on the full 100% sample, but on a randomly selected
10% subsample that serves as cross-validation to ensure that not a particular subsample is driv-
ing the results. Again, the results are qualitatively the same and quantitatively similar, even after
the reduction in the sample size that amounts to the attenuation bias. Corresponding results are
reported in Tables A.1 and A.2.
Furthermore, I include the career mobility results estimated using the randomly selected
10% sample to demonstrate that the results are sensitive to this choice and are not driven by a
particular subset of the sample. Corresponding results are reported in Tables A.7, A.8 and A.9.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper concludes that female bosses help to reduce the gender wage gap and the pro-
motion gap after controlling for all other characteristics in the data. The most plausible reason
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for such effect can be attributed to the mentoring story, rather than the statistical discrimination
or taste-based discrimination. The evidence provided shows that female leadership’s effect on the
gender wage gap is significantly stronger for offices that are smaller in size and for employees who
are already on higher levels of the pay distribution. However, further analysis is needed to confirm
the mentorship theory.
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Exhibit 1.1: Example Offices, 10% Sample
Greenville Offices (top 2 largest):
- Social Security Administration (10 people)
- Veteran and Health Administration (VA) (8 people)
Clemson Offices (top 2 largest):
- Forest Service (USDA) (3 people)
- Agricultural Research Service (USDA) (2 people)
Boston Offices (top 5 largest):
- Veterans Health Administration (VA) (253 people)
- Environment Protection Agency (63 people)
- Transportation Security Administration(43 people)
- Social Security Administration (42 people)
- Internal Revenue Service (DTRS) (40 people)
Top 7 Largest of All Offices:
- National Institute of Health (HHS) (1118 people), Bethesda, Maryland
- Social Security Administration (985 people), Woodlawn , Maryland
- Patent and Trademark Office(COM) (729 people), Alexandria, Virginia
- Department of State (547 people), Washington, District of Columbia
- Veterans Health Administration (VA) (487 people) , Los Angeles, California
- Patent and Trademark Office(COM) (482 people), Arlington, Virginia
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (DOJ), (481 people), Washington, District of Columbia
Figure 1.2: Female Representation Among
Leadership Positions Over Year
Figure 1.3: Female Representation in Dif-
ferent Occupation Category Over Time
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Figure 1.4: Median Real Basic Pay Over
Year
Figure 1.5: Median Real Basic Pay Over
Age
Figure 1.6: Median Real Basic Pay Over
Tenure
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Chapter 2
The Effects of FMLA on Women’s
Promotion in the Federal Government
Joint work with Patrick Warren
Summary Using the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) data and imputed fertility rates from Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) data, I examine the effects of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) on
the promotion of women into managerial positions. I find that after the FMLA was passed in 1993, there was a
significant change in the relationship between fertility and promotion, with fertility becoming more negatively
associated with promotion. Compared to the relationship prior to 1993, a 10% increase in fertility is associated
with an additional 1.3% decline in the probability of being promoted. This suggests that the FMLA may have
inhibited the relative career progress of women in high-fertility demographic groups in the U.S. federal civil
service system. 1
Keywords: Family Medical Leave Act, Office of Personnel Management, female, promotion, fertility
JEL Classification: J16, J31
1Parts of this research were supported by National Science Foundation grant #ACI-14-43014.
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2.1 Introduction
In April 2016 New York passed a law requiring up to 12 weeks of partially paid time off
for new parents, funded through a weekly payroll tax. The next day, San Francisco became the first
city in the U.S. to require employers to offer six weeks of fully paid leave for new parents. Are
these policies going to help or harm women’s careers? One could imagine myriad impacts of these
sorts family-friendly policies throughout the stages of a career: hiring, retention, and promotion. In
this paper we want to focus on one aspect of a career, promotion into management or supervisory
roles; analyze an important precursor to these more generous policies, the Family Medical Leave
Act (FMLA); and do so in a context where it is uniquely possible to carefully trace the progress of
large set of employees throughout their careers, in U.S. Federal Civil Service.
Movement into supervisory positions is an important element of career progress. Man-
agerial positions are on top of the career ladder, receive higher salaries, and establish a general
managerial set of skills that are valuable in the market, more generally. For example, according to
Forbes in 2016, chief executives are among top ten best paying jobs in the US. And it may be par-
ticularly important for understanding the relative progress of women. Over the last half century
the gender pay gap between men and women has been shrinking, with the strongest wage conver-
gence in the 1980s (Blau and Kahn, 2008). According to Blau and Kahn (2016b), however, between
1980 and 2010 the wage gap fell faster at the bottom than at the top of the distribution, and a large
gap remains at the top of the distribution. This exception to the general convergance suggests that
some factor remains that differentially affects the entrance of women to the upper echelons of the
wage ladder. In this paper, we investigate whether a family-friendly policy like those recently im-
plemented might affect the entry of women into such managerial or supervisory positions. To do
so, we look at the impact of a earlier policy that introduced a weaker set of related requirements on
employers, the FMLA.
The Family Medical Leave Act was introduced in 1993. It requires all federal government
offices, regardless of the number of employees an office has, to provide up to 12 weeks of unpaid
leave to an eligible employee while maintaining their current health insurance benefits. Employers
are required to return these employees to the same (or equivalent) position as they had prior to
taking this leave with equivalent pay, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment.
An employee’s use of FMLA leave cannot be counted against the employee under a “no-fault”
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attendance policy. Employers are also required to continue group health insurance coverage for an
employee on FMLA leave under the same terms and conditions as if the employee had not taken
leave. To become eligible for FMLA, a federal employee must work for the federal government for
at least 12 months2 prior to the leave and have an eligible reason for the leave. Eligible employees
may take up to 12 workweeks of leave in a 12-month period for one or more of the following
reasons: the birth of a son or daughter or placement of a son or daughter with the employee for
adoption or foster care; to care for a spouse, son, daughter, or parent who has a serious health
condition; for a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the essential
functions of his or her job; or for any qualifying exigency arising out of the fact that a spouse,
son, daughter, or parent is a military member on covered active duty or call to covered active duty
status. However, the majority of FMLA leaves occur due to a child birth, and this was one of the
major reasons that the FMLA was created. Thus, the majority of people who take FMLA leave are
women.
We employ a unique data set from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) that follows
the careers of all civilian federal government employees from 1988 till 2011. The structure of these
data is particularly suitable to answer our main question , i.e. how the adoption of the FMLA
affects women’s promotions into central positions. The OPM data provides us with information on
over 3.4 million individuals, on their wages, career progressions, education, benefits, organizations
they work, clear job assignments, and other information. Moreover, we can clearly distinguish
between promotions into central positions versus promotions into non-supervisory line positions.
In our paper we focus only on the promotions into the following categories: Supervisor or Manager,
Leader, Team leader, Supervisor (CSRA) and Management Official (CSRA)3.
The effect of the FMLA on women’s promotions is theoretically ambiguous. On the one
hand, mandated leave could add a significant cost in promoting a woman to a central position,
since the employee may leave for three months due to child birth, but must be guaranteed the op-
portunity to return to a similar role. Thus, the organization is left unable to fill it with a permanent
replacement and must “make do” in the meantime, a risky and costly position to be in. As a result,
the FMLA may diminish women’s promotion opportunities. An employer making the choice be-
tween two identical employees who have only one difference, fertility rate, might choose the one
2The 12 months of employment do not have to be consecutive. That means any time previously worked for the same
employer (including seasonal work) could, in most cases, be used to meet the 12-month requirement.
3The classification is taken from the OPM code-book.
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with a lower fertility rate in order to avoid the disruption of a long leave. For example, a man
(with zero fertility) or a woman above 40 (with close to zero fertility), may be more attractive than
a woman with a high fertility “risk”. On the other hand, the FMLA could have a positive effect on
women’s promotions. For example, the FMLA could strengthen the employees’ attachment to the
firm, since a pregnant mother knows her job is waiting for her when she returns from her leave.
This fact may boost firm-specific or position-specific investments. As a result, the promotion rate
for women could rise.
In order to examine the effect of the Family and Medical Leave Act on the likelihood of
promotions we exploit the variation in the expected fertility of women . We combine the OPM data
with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention natality data on the average number of children
born per female by year, race, and age bracket. The idea is that each female worker can be assigned
an expected fertility for a woman of her age, race, and year, and we can relate this expected fertility
to her chance of promotion, both before and after the passage of the FMLA.
We estimate a linear probability model explaining promotion into managerial (central) po-
sitions. The explanatory variable of interest is an interactive term between expected fertility and a
dummy variable for 1993-2011 (years in which the FMLA was active). After controlling for age, job
tenure (experience), level of education, yearly dummies, age dummies, race dummies, and occupa-
tional dummies, we want to know if the relationship between average fertility rates and promotion
probabilities changes in the years after the FMLA was implemented and, if so, how much and in
which direction.
We find that after the FMLA was passed in 1993, there was a significant change in the
relationship between expected fertility and promotion, with expected fertility becoming more neg-
atively associated with promotion. Compared to the relationship prior to 1993, a 10 percentage
point increase in expected fertility is associated with an additional 0.86 percentage point decline in
the probability of being promoted. This relationship is robust to several definitions of promotions,
and suggests that something changed in the years since the FMLA was passed that may have in-
hibited the relative progress of women in high-fertility demographic groups up through the U.S.
federal civil service system. Moreover, if we control for individual fixed effects or employ the haz-
ard model analysis, we get similar results both in the magnitude and the direction. Finally, in the
model when we control for individual fixed effects and we run the same model on men matching
them with the corresponding female fertility, the coefficient on interactive term between fertility
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and a dummy variable for 1993-2011 is insignificant.
Our findings align well with Thomas (2015), the only other paper to investigate the re-
lationship between the FMLA and promotions. He investigates how mandated maternity leave
policies impact the gender gap in promotions in the private sector. He finds that women hired after
the enactment of the FMLA were five percent more likely to remain employed but eight percent
less likely to be promoted than those who were hired before the FMLA. He finds that information
asymmetry drives the increase in gender gap in promotions. However, Thomas does not have the
detailed data on types of promotions; while, we can differentiate between promotions into various
supervisory positions and other types of promotions. Thus, we focus solely how the FMLA affects
women’s promotions into managerial positions. In addition, Thomas looks into the private sec-
tor; while, we are focusing on Federal government employees. Finally, Thomas does not have the
detailed fertility on women and he uses the assumption that women’s fertility after 40 is zero.
2.2 Literature Review
Our analysis contributes to three literatures, in increasing generality. First, we contribute
to a large literature on the effects of the FMLA on women. Waldfogel, Higuchi, and Abe (1999)
finds that the FMLA had a small, positive effect on leave-taking among employees of medium
sized firms (with 100 to 499 employees) but no effect on employees of large firms (500 or more
employees). Further, her findings demonstrate no significant effects on employment and wages.
Baum (2003)shows that the FMLA induces women to postpone their return to work, but eventu-
ally brings more women back to work. Also he found that family leave legislation has not affected
overall employment levels or wages among women of childbearing age. Averett and Whittington
(2001) investigate other potential effects of the FMLA such as whether maternity leave affects fer-
tility. Their results suggest that women with maternity leave are significantly more likely to give
birth. Also they found that the fertility plans do not influence job sorting based on maternity leave
benefits.
Second, we contribute to a broader literature on the differential (and sometimes perverse)
effects of family-friendliness on women’s careers. Klerman and Leibowitz (1999) find that prior to
the passage of the statutes, 60% of NLSY mothers who were working full-time before giving birth
were working at the same job after giving birth and the fertility plans do not influence job sorting
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based on maternity leave benefits. Also, the theory suggests that a mother should earn a higher
wage at the job that she held before giving birth than at a new job because she can continue to
benefit from the firm-specific human capital that she accumulated prior to giving birth (Spalter-
Roth, Hartmann, and Andrews, 1993; Waldfogel, 1997, 1998; Klerman and Leibowitz, 1999). argues
that maternity leave legislation should not increase wages by improving return-to-work decisions
if employers and employees are able to voluntarily negotiate maternity leave provisions without
maternity leave legislation. Klerman and Leibowitz (1999) demonstrate that state maternity leave
legislation does not have a significant effect on employment. Dalto (1989); Spalter-Roth et al. (1993);
Waldfogel (1997) find that women’s wages are higher if they were covered by an employer’s ma-
ternity leave policy voluntarily provided by employers. Baker and Milligan (2008), using Canadian
data, find that modest leave entitlements of 17—18 weeks do not change the amount of time moth-
ers spend away from work. In contrast, longer leaves do have a substantive impact on behavior,
leading to more time spent at home. Also they find that all entitlement they examined increase job
continuity with the pre-birth employer.
Finally, we contribute to a literature on the determinants of the career trajectories of public
sector employees. Bolton and de Figueiredo (2017) find that the unconditional gender wage gap
in public sector has been large but steadily declining over the time period but almost half the
magnitude of the private sector. They show that entry wages for men are higher than entry wages
for women in the public sector and promotions are similar for both groups while the wage gap
increase during employee’s tenure.
2.3 Data and Empirical Analysis
2.3.1 The data
Our primary data on career trajectories come from the OPM federal employment records,
which tracks 3.4 unique individuals or 28 million person-year observations. We restrict to those
between the ages of 20 and 65 who work full time in non-seasonal jobs and are observed at least
twice from 1988-2011 (24 years). These records include information on promotions, wages, work
schedules, awards, and supervisory status, as well as demographic and educational information.
The main advantage of dataset is that it provides information on the exact career path of the gov-
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ernment employees if he or she does not leave the government job. Our dataset is also much larger
than Federal Scope Employee cube or Central Personal data releases. In our benchmark model
we define a promotion as equal to one if at this point in time a person holds a supervisory po-
sition consistent with the OPM code book4. In 1993 two separate categories called “Supervisor”
and “Manager” were combined into one called “Supervisor or Manager”. We code our definition
of promotion accordingly. We also use these OPM data to create a number of categorical control
variables: age by 5-year ranges, tenure by years in government, occupation by seven occupation
classes, race , and six educational categories.
In order to examine the effect of the FMLA on women’s promotions into supervisory po-
sitions we exploit the variation in the average fertility of women by age, race, and birth year. We
impute fertility rates from the CDC natality dataset by calculating the fraction of women of a given
age, race, and birth year to give birth in each year. For falsification we also impute a placebo fertility
rate for every male in our sample.
Table 1 depicts the percentage of people ever promoted by gender together with the de-
scriptive statistic on the fertility variable. For example, 12.9% of males have been promoted at least
once into a central position. Also, the highest probability of having a child is 23.6%.
Table 2.1: Promotion and Fertility Rates
Promotion
Male Female
% Person-Year Promoted 12.9 9.9
% Person-Year Not Promoted 87.1 90.1
% Person Ever Promoted 14.7 12.5
% Person Ever Not Promoted 99.9 99.9
Fertility
Mean — 0.025
Std. Dev. — 0.039
Max — 0.236
Min — 0
Note: Promotion is defined as a change of service status from
non-supervisory position into supervisory position
4Supervisor or Manager, Leader, Team leader, Supervisor (CSRA) and Management Official (CSRA)*
36
2.3.2 Empirical Analysis
Using the OPM and the CDC natality data we exploit the fertility variation of women by
age, race, and birth year in order to study the effect of the Family Medical Leave Act passed in 1993
on promotions of women into supervisory positions. Our main model is a linear probability model
which measures the relationship between the FMLA and promotions of women into supervisory5
positions. We start with a 10% random sample of 3.4 million individuals.
Promotedi,t =αi + β1Fertilityi,t × IFMLA + β2Fertilityi,t
+Beduc · Ieduc +Brace · Irace +Bage · Iage
+Byear · Iyear +Boccp · Ioccp +Btenure · I tenure
+ εi,t (2.1)
Promotedi,t is equal to 1 if a person moves into one of the central positions mentioned
in previous section and is equal to 0 otherwise. Once a person is promoted they are dropped for
subsequent years. We estimate the following equation for a federal government employee i in
vectors, Beduc,Brace,Bage,Byear,Boccp and Btenure are vectors of education, race, year, occupation,
and tenure fixed effects. The parameter of interest is β1,which is the coefficient on the interaction
term between fertility and dummy variable for the year the FMLA is active (1993-2011). Intuitively,
it measures how the relationship between fertility and probability of promotion changes in the
years after the FMLA was implemented. The thought experiment is to think about pairs of women,
one high anticipated fertility and one low anticipated fertility, alike in all other characteristics, and
see if their promotion rates are different and, in turn, whether that difference changes in the post-
FMLA years.
We also include a with-employee estimate, Model 2 ,which is the same as Model 1 but we
add individual fixed effects. The thought experiment here is different. It asks, among women who
are promoted, whether their promotion is more likely to occur in high- or low- anticipated fertility
years, controlling for other characteristics, and whether that relationship changes in the years after
the FMLA is implemented.
5In our paper we use “supervisory position”, “managerial position” or “central position” interchangeably.
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Table 2.2: The Relationship between Anticipated Fertility and Promotion for Women, before and
after FMLA Adoption
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Fertilityi,t ∗ IFMLA -0.0858*** 0.0177 -0.0381** 0.018
Fertilityi,t 0.2248*** 0.035 0.1531*** 0.033
Education:
No Bachelors -0.002*** 0.0007 0.0045 0.0029
Bachelors 0.0267*** 0.001 0.0186*** 0.0038
Masters 0.0493*** 0.0013 0.0683*** 0.0046
Professional Degr. 0.0899*** 0.0022 0.1035*** 0.0115
Advanced Cert. 0.099*** 0.01 0.1048*** 0.0351
PhD 0.0753*** 0.0026 0.0995*** 0.0117
— — — — —
Individual FEs × X
Note: Linear probability model. ***:0.001, **:0.01, *:0.05
The results of these two analyses are presented in Table 2. Considering first Model 1, the
coefficient of interest β2 is significant and negative. It says that in the years after the FMLA was
implemented women with 10 percentage points higher anticipated fertility in a year are about 0.9
percentage points less likely to be promoted in that year than they would have been in the pre-
FMLA years.
Model 2 tells a very similar story, where the promoted women are less likely to be promoted
in high-anticipated-fertility years in the post-FMLA era than they are in the pre-FMLA era. Women
with 10 percentage points higher anticipated fertility in a given year are about 0.2 percentage points
less likely to receive their promotion in that year.
It is important to note, in interpreting these relationships, is that anticipated fertility has a
very strong direct, positive relationship to promotion. We put no causal interpretation on the direct
relationship between anticipated fertility and promotion, however, as it merely indicates that, on
average, anticipated fertility is positive correlated with factors that are valuable in supervisory
positions. Nevertheless, we believe it’s reasonable to put a causal interpretation on our interaction,
since FMLA is unlikely to affect the cost or benefits of non-fertility-related factors that are correlated
with anticipated fertility.
The major threat to identification for out interaction effect, we believe, is actually not omit-
ted variables that are correlated with anticipated fertility but rather omitted variables that are cor-
related with FMLA adoption. Since FMLA adoption is only identified in the time series, we worry
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Table 2.3: The Relationship between Placebo Anticipated Fertility and Promotion for Men, be-
fore and after FMLA Adoption
Model 1
Coefficient Std. Err.
Fertilityi,t ∗ IFMLA -0.02 0.023
Fertilityi,t 0.1 0.05
Education:
No Bachelors 0.002 0.002
Bachelors 0.037*** 0.002
Masters 0.064*** 0.003
Professional Degr. 0.094*** 0.003
Advanced Cert. 0.017 0.016
PhD 0.088*** 0.004
— — —
Individual FEs X
Note: Linear probability model. ***:0.001, **:0.01, *:0.05
that other changes in federal government policy or practice at the same time could have affected
the promotion rates along dimensions that are correlated with anticipated fertility. To address this
concern, we repeat the analysis above for a subset of employees for which the taking up of FMLA
benefits should not be related to female fertility rates, men. Thus, if the change in the relationship
between anticipated fertility and promotion in the post-FMLA period is actually being driven by
other factors that are correlated with anticipated fertility, we should see that relationship for those
workers, too. In fact, when we use placebo fertility for men, we see no relationship between fertility
and promotion in either period, suggesting that fertility may, in fact, have been the proper channel.
2.4 Conclusion
We find that women in high fertility cohort/years have career trajectories that are nega-
tively affected by the FMLA, i.e women with higher fertility are less likely to be promoted into
supervisory or managerial positions after the enactment of the FMLA. In particular, a 10 percent-
age point increase in expected fertility is associated with an additional 0.86 percentage point de-
cline in a promotion rate in the model without fixed effects. As we mentioned earlier the result is
robust to different definitions of promotions which suggests that something changed in the years
since FMLA was passed that may have inhibited the relative progress of women in high-fertility
demographic groups in the federal government system.
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Chapter 3
Does Medicaid Expansion Increase
Fertility? Evidence under Alternative
Insurance
Joint work with Scott Barkowski
Summary This paper investigates the effect of Medicaid expansion on the fertility rate using individual level
panel data under alternative insurance. We find that without controlling for an alternative insurance, Medi-
caid eligibility expansion has no significant effect on female fertility. However, we find that for those females
not covered by insurance, Medicaid eligibility increases fertility by 5 percentage points per year over time.
Such effect is both statistical and economically significant and is stronger among groups of females that are
un-married or not employed. These evidence suggests that Medicaid program as a social benefit is more ef-
fective for those who need it the most.
Keywords: Medicaid expansion, fertility, fixed effects, Cox survival model
JEL Classification: J16, J31
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3.1 Introduction
Beginning in 1984, eligibility for Medicaid expanded dramatically for pregnant women
and children. During the same period, the U.S. fertility rate rose and the abortion rate declined. It
is a natural question to ask: does Medicaid expansion increase fertility? What makes this question
more relevant today is the increased role of Medicaid. In 2007 over 13% of the total U.S. population
was covered by Medicaid (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008), and even more of the population is eligible
but currently not enrolled. Medicaid has covered over one-third of births in years since the 1990s
expansions were completed (Cutler and Gruber, 1996b). Moreover, due to the recent uncertainties
around the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”) the subsidized insurance cov-
erage could be revoked. These recent developments call for a timely investigation of the effect of
Medicaid on fertility in order to understand the potential policy implications.
In this paper, we employ a unique identification strategy to estimate the effect of Medi-
caid expansion on fertility. There are three distinguishing features of our approach that allow for
more reliable causal inference than previous studies. First, we use individual level data rather than
state-level aggregate data. This corrects for the bias induced by aggregation. For example, suppose
Medicaid has no effect on fertility, and during the period of Medicaid expansion only those who
are not eligible for Medicaid had increased fertility, while those who are eligible did not. In this
scenario one would observe, in aggregate data, an increase in total fertility and an increase in Med-
icaid coverage. Second, we consider the effect of an alternative insurance which further corrects
for the bias induced by substitution. For example, Medicaid as a health insurance benefit should
only provide incentive if a female is not already covered by an alternative insurance. If during the
Medicaid expansion women, who are actually benefiting from Medicaid, have no fertility changes;
while women, who are eligible but would not benefit from Medicaid (due to an alternative in-
surance), have increased in fertility, then one may draw the conclusion that Medicaid eligibility
increases fertility, while it actually does not. Third, we track individual for multiple periods over
time, which aligns individuals’ future fertility to the same set of individuals’ Medicaid eligibility,
rather than different set of individuals’ eligibility, and further encompasses the delayed effect on
fertility in response to Medicaid eligibility.
Our results show that Medicaid eligibility, for those females who can actually benefit from
it (do not have an alternative insurance), increases fertility rate by 5 percentage points a year over
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time. The effect is statistically and economically significant, and the increase of fertility rate is
almost linearly proportional over time. Without considering an alternative insurance, there are
no statistical or economically significant effect of Medicaid eligibility on fertility. Moreover, when
we breakdown the sample by different groups, we find that for females that are unmarried, or
unemployed the effect of Medicaid eligibility on fertility is particularly strong relative to females
that are married or employed. These evidence suggests that the Medicaid program as an aid is
more effective for those who need it the most.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 3.2 reviews the background of the
study and the existing literature; section 3.3 summarizes our data and variables; section 3.4 dis-
cusses in detail the empirical identification and estimation strategy and presents the main results
of the paper; section 3.5 discusses the robustness checks; section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Background and Literature
3.2.1 The Expansion of Medicaid Eligibility in the U.S.
As pointed out by Cutler and Gruber (1996b), the expansion of the Medicaid program
has been one of the most important changes in the health insurance market in the United States.
Traditionally, Medicaid coverage among the low income families was limited to recipients of AFDC
(Aid to Families with Dependent Children) program, which effectively limited to single women
with children and below half of the poverty line. However, the eligibility was expanded beyond
AFDC recipients. Expansion over time occurred at different rates across states and across different
demographic groups. By 1992, individuals with income below 100 percent or more of the poverty
line are covered, with some states expanding up to 185 percent below the poverty line.
Figure 3.1 depicts the expansion of Medicaid coverage. It is produced using our data in
terms of fraction of eligible women. It shows that between 1988 and 1991, the coverage of Medicaid
increased sharply1.
1Similar pattern is also observed in Zavodny and Bitler (2010) which illustrates the expansion of Medicaid in terms of
income threshold
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Figure 3.1: The Expansion of Medicaid
3.2.2 Theoretical Mechanisms of Medicaid and Fertility
The purpose of Medicaid as an insurance benefit program is unambiguous; its ex-ante
economic impact, however, is less clear. The total effects of Medicaid on fertility could result from
mechanisms of opposite signs. For example, one might view that Medicaid expansions have a
positive effect on birth rates: the reduction in health care costs lowers the total cost of a child,
thus should increase the number of children; or the reduction in health care costs effectively raises
income (net of such costs) should increase the number of children; or as noted by Hotz, Klerman,
and Willis (1997), increases in income, that are not due to increases in women’s earnings, have
a positive, but small effect on fertility. Yet, other economic mechanisms, on the contrary, imply
that Medicaid expansions have a negative effect on birth rates. For example, Medicaid expansions
could increase women’s labor force participation, and higher labor force participation could lead to
lower birth rates; if the expansions improved child health outcomes, parents might have opted to
have fewer births as the ”quality versus quantity” trade-off in Becker (1960); Also, the expansions
also may have increased some women’s access to family planning, reducing unwanted births. One
can also potentially believe that there are no significant effects on birth rates by Medicaid simply
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because eligible women were unaware of or did not respond to the changes in legislature.
3.2.3 Empirical Literature
In an attempt to address the causal relationship between Medicaid expansion and the em-
pirically observed increase in birth rate, one has to go beyond a simple correlation analysis. Pre-
vious literature on the topic has sought to answer this question, but the empirical methods were
unsatisfactory and results were rather contradictory.
The literature has empirically documented an increase in fertility rate during the Medicaid
expansion. For example, in the study of Joyce, Kaestner, and Kwan (1998), they use the pooled
regressions over 15 state level data, and concluded that Medicaid expansion is associated with
a 5% increase in the birthrate among white women, while no relationship among black women,
and no evidence on the abortion rate due to inadequate data. The procedure is simply regressing
the logarithms of abortion rates or birthrates on the indicator of two phases of expansion. The
regression on aggregated variables may reduce the idiosyncratic noise and thus increase the power
of the test, yet the design is only able to address the question to the extent of ”statistical association”,
subject to potentially serious missing variable biases. The state level data is unable address whether
the positive association between Medicaid expansion and fertility increase is due to some missing
variable or not. One example of this is eligibility: if Medicaid expansion is the main driver behind
fertility increase, then Medicaid should have effect only on woman who are eligible, and no effect
on woman who are not eligible. Therefore, an increase in fertility for non-eligible woman should
not be considered as effect of Medicaid. The data used has no information on the individual’s
eligibility to Medicaid, rendering the procedure unable to address the core issue: does Medicaid
provide positive incentive for woman to give birth?
In a later paper, Zavodny and Bitler (2010) analyze the National Center for Health Statistics
(NCHS) dataset with 50 states from 1982 to 1996 and they address the lack of information on the el-
igibility by examining whether state-level birth and abortion rates are related to the extent of states
Medicaid eligibility expansions and the fraction of women eligible for Medicaid. They find little
evidence that the Medicaid expansions led to changes in birth rates or abortion rates. However,
among white women who have not completed high school, Medicaid expansions boosted the birth
rate, controlling for economic and demographic factors. This approach addresses the eligibility at
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the aggregate state-level, but still unable to control for alternative insurance.
In a more recent paper and the closest to our paper, DeLeire, Lopoo, and Simon (2007)
conclude, in contradiction to Joyce et al. (1998), that there is no statistical significant effect from
Medicaid expansion to fertility. In this paper the authors restrict the focus on the effects on ”net
fertility”, the likelihood of a women having a child. The ”net fertility” differs from ”total fertility” in
the sense that changes in ”net fertility” includes both change of demand for children (total fertility),
as well as the timing for giving birth. They use the 1985 to 1996 data from National Center for
Health Statistics (NCHS) for birth rates and the Current Population Survey (CPS) for a measure of
the generosity of state Medicaid programs. They categorized women into 44 cells based on their
age,education, marital status, demographic characteristics, and created a ”simulated eligibility”
measure and allocate them into the 44 cells. Thus allowing a certain degree of inference on the
causal relationship. Yet, their data have no information if women have health insurance already
and they can not link women over time to observe actual changes in birth rates. In contrast, in our
paper we observe individuals over time and we can see if a child is born a year or more after the
Medicaid eligibility. Finally, we know if a woman has already another insurance when she becomes
eligible for Medicaid.
3.3 Data and Variables
In this section we discuss in detail the data used in this paper and the construction of the
variables.
3.3.1 SIPP Panel Waves
The data is used from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). SIPP is a
household-based survey designed as a continuous series of national panels. Each panel contains a
nationally representative sample interviewed every four months over the life of this panel. Such
four-month-long subdivision is called a ”wave”. The number of waves varies from panel to panel.
We use panels from 1986 till 1991. Each panel surveys completely different individuals. We use
panels which last at least two years; in other words, each panel has at least six waves. For example,
1986 and 1987 panels has seven waves; while 1988 panel has six waves and 1990 and 1991 panels
have eight waves. For example, if an individual is from panel 1991, she will appear in our data eight
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times (once in each of the eight waves) every four months, i.e she is followed for two years and 8
months till 1993. In this study, we use the same data as in Barkowski (2014). Existing research that
also uses the same dataset includes Currie and Gruber (1996a,b) Cutler and Gruber (1996a) Cutler
and Gruber (1996b) Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) Gruber and Simon (2008)
3.3.2 Variable Construction
In this study, we restrict the sample to females who, at the time the first wave of the panel
was surveyed, are between the age of 15 to 44, and are the only reproductive female in the house-
hold, and do not have an infant. We track these individuals over time and construct their fertility
variables, insurance coverage and eligibility as well as other human capital variables. Figure 3.2
reports the distribution of number of waves a female is present in the sample. Majority of the
individuals are present in the sample for six or more waves, as the SIPP survey aims to.
Figure 3.2: Histogram of Number of Waves Present
Our primary dependent variable of interest is the cumulative birth rate: Birthi,t→t+h which
is an indicator variable for whether the individual will give birth in the following h months, with
horizons determined by the survey panel waves h = 0, 4, 8, 12, 16.
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To compare with the literature and perform sanity check, we compute the cumulative fer-
tility rate over time and plot in the following Figure 3.3 which reports the cumulative fertility com-
puted in our sample of females. We see that the annualized (approximately 3 panel waves after the
first wave) General Fertility Rate (GFR) is approximately 0.0714, which is close to the statistics of
67.3-70.9 per 1000 female reported by Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) data for
the period between 1988-1992. On the bottom panel, I also report the cumulative fertility rate for
different demographic groups. Specifically, we see that unemployed or married female have higher
fertility rate than average.
Our primary explanatory variable of interest is the state-level imputed individual eligibil-
ity for the Medicaid program: Eligi,t indicates whether individual i at time t is eligible for Medicaid.
This variable is constructed using Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) instruments. The eligibility data is
taken from Barkowski (2014), and the approach follows that of Cutler and Gruber (1996a,b); Gruber
and Yelowitz (1999); Gruber and Simon (2008)
Our next explanatory variable of interest is the individual level of an alternative insurance.
We construct the variable NoInsi,t to indicate that a female does not have an alternative insurance
at the time the survey was conducted.
We further use the following categorical variables to control for group fixed effects: racei
classifies the female into white, black, American Indian and Asian categories; kid5i indicates whether
the female has a kid under five years old; and kid17i indicates whether the female has a kid under
17 years old; year-monthi is the year and month when the survey is conducted; statei is the state
the person is at; agei,t is an individual’s age; educi,t is the level of education a person received,
classified into no high school degree, high school degree, some college education, and college and
above; Empi,t indicates whether a female is employed or not.
Table 3.1 reports the averages of the primary variables of interest by marital status, race,
education, and employment.
3.4 Empirical Framework
In this section, we discuss the several empirical strategies we take to identify the effect of
Medicaid eligibility on fertility. We present the results which demonstrate that when controlling
for an alternative insurance and other individual characteristics, Medicaid eligibility in fact has a
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Figure 3.3: Cumulative Fertility Rate over Time
positive effect on female fertility.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics by Demographic Groups
Birthi,t→t+h (%) Insurance (%) # Obs
h = 0 h = 4 h = 8 h = 12 h = 16 Eligi,t NoInsi,t Bothi,t
Total 0.070 0.084 0.098 0.111 0.125 0.337 0.212 0.092 174,752
By Marital Status
Un-Married 0.030 0.035 0.043 0.051 0.060 0.382 0.328 0.146 65,377
Married 0.095 0.113 0.131 0.147 0.163 0.310 0.143 0.059 109,375
By Race
Black 0.064 0.077 0.090 0.102 0.112 0.372 0.386 0.172 19,316
White 0.071 0.084 0.098 0.112 0.125 0.332 0.187 0.081 149,455
By Education
No College Education 0.070 0.084 0.098 0.111 0.123 0.421 0.301 0.145 92,684
College or Above 0.071 0.084 0.099 0.112 0.127 0.242 0.111 0.032 82,068
By Employment
Not Employed 0.106 0.125 0.139 0.148 0.156 0.371 0.377 0.166 63,311
Employed 0.050 0.061 0.076 0.091 0.108 0.318 0.118 0.050 111,441
Sample is restricted to females during reproductive age (15-44), who do not have an infant, are the only repro-
ductive females in households at the time of first wave of the panels. There are a total of 28,221 unique females
and a total of 174,752 person-wave observations. Eligi,t is the state-level eligibility calculated using Gruber and
Yelowitz (1999) instrument.
3.4.1 Identification Strategy in the Presence of Alternative Insurance
Medicaid, as an insurance aid, may alter the fertility decisions of a woman if she does not
have an alternative insurance. However, if one already has an insurance coverage which provides
similar or identical benefits as the Medicaid, it is unlikely that the expansion of Medicaid will have
any impact on the women’s fertility decisions. Therefore, we also aim to identify the potential
effects of Medicaid in the presence of alternative insurance.
Specifically, we formulate the following breakdown in Table 3.2 based on the Medicaid
eligibility and alternative insurance coverage. We should expect the effect for only the individuals
who are covered by Medicaid while having no other alternative insurance.
Table 3.2: Groups based on Medicaid Eligibility and Alternative Insurance Coverage
No Insurance Coverage
0 1
Medicaid Eligibility 1 A: No Effect B: Group Expect Effect
0 C: No Effect D: No Effect
To estimate the impact of Medicaid eligibility change from non-eligible to eligible is to
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compute the following difference-in-difference estimate:
DiD = (B −D) − (A− C)︷ ︸︸ ︷
Effect of Interest
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Adjust for Medicaid Diff.
=β3,
where β3 is the regression coefficient from the following full interaction fixed-effect model in Equa-
tion (3.1),
Birthi,t→t+h = α+ β1Eligi,t + β2NoInsi,t + β3Eligi,t ×NoInsi,t
+
∑
γjδji,t + ei,t, (3.1)
where Birthi,t→t+h is the cumulative fertility rate of a women from time t to h months later, Eligi,t
and NoInsi,t are the Medicaid eligibility (the state-level eligibility calculated using Gruber and
Yelowitz (1999) instrument) and no alternative health insurance coverage. The group fixed effect
variables include race,full interaction between kid5 and kid17, year-month, state, full interaction
between age and educ, and state-year.
The relative fertility estimates in terms of coefficients β’s are B = β1 + β2 + β3, D = β2,
A = β1 and C = 0. Thus the fertility effect of switching from not Medicaid eligible to Medicaid
eligible in the presence of alternative insurance is β3.
3.4.2 Group Fixed Effect: Base Case
To establish the base case results, we first estimate the 3.1 model using group fixed effects
on pooled individual and panel waves data for h = 4, 8, 12, 16. For comparison, we included the
coefficient estimates for the case where only Medicaid Eligibility was used in the regression.
Table 3.3 reports the estimation results of this regression. We see that without controlling
for alternative insurance, the Medicaid eligibility is statistically insignificant in explaining future
fertility across all 4,8,12,16 months. However, once we controlled for the presence of alternative
insurance, the Medicaid eligibility has significant positive effect for those who do not already have
insurance. This demonstrates the results that Medicaid as a health care benefit do have effect for
those individuals who need them. The fertility rate four months in the future for a female who does
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Table 3.3: Group Fixed Effect: Base Case
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LHS = Birthi,t→t+h h = 4 h = 4 h = 8 h = 8 h = 12 h = 12 h = 16 h = 16
(β1)Eligi,t 0.00490 -0.000453 0.00617 -0.00528 0.00405 -0.0138 0.0114 -0.0120
(0.0113) (0.0111) (0.0239) (0.0245) (0.0328) (0.0333) (0.0399) (0.0419)
(β2)NoInsi,t -0.00529 -0.0130∗∗ -0.0204∗∗ -0.0220∗∗
(0.00328) (0.00581) (0.00775) (0.0103)
(β3)Eligi,t × NoInsi,t 0.0152∗∗ 0.0325∗∗ 0.0499∗∗∗ 0.0649∗∗
(0.00664) (0.0125) (0.0180) (0.0254)
# Obs. 118251 118251 99088 99088 79984 79984 60962 60962
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.019 0.039 0.039 0.055 0.055 0.071 0.071
Group FEs X X X X X X X X
Sample is restricted to females during reproductive age (15-44), who does not have an infant, are the only
reproductive female in the household, at the time of first wave of the panels; There are a total of 28,221
unique females and a total of 174,752 person-wave observation. The group fixed effects terms include
race, kid5##kid17, year-month, state, age##educ, state×year. Eligi,t is the state-level eligibility calculated
using Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) instrument
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
not have an infant in the current wave is increased by 1.52% if she becomes eligible for Medicaid
and currently does not have an alternative insurance. The same number is increased to 3.25%,
4.99% and 6.49% in 8, 12, and 16 months respectively. However, as we increase the horizon, the
number of observations usable to estimate the model drops as our survey only tracks individual
up to 8 waves and some households move and disappear from the survey.
3.4.3 Group Fixed Effect by Marital Status
Next we consider the group fixed effect model on different demographic groups to assess
the effects of Medicaid expansion on fertility of different groups. We start by investigating the
differences across marital status.
Table 3.4 reports the coefficient estimates of equation (3.1) on two sets of samples: married
and unmarried. One can see that overall, for married females, the effect of Medicaid eligibility
under no insurance is stronger on longer horizons, where it becomes significant on 8 and above
horizons. However, for unmarried females the same effect is significant even at the four months
horizon.
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Table 3.4: Group Fixed Effect: By Marital Status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LHS = Birthi,t→t+h h = 4 h = 4 h = 8 h = 8 h = 12 h = 12 h = 16 h = 16
Married
(β1)Eligi,t 0.0102 0.00728 0.00339 -0.00400 -0.00386 -0.0172 0.0107 -0.00559
(0.0156) (0.0161) (0.0335) (0.0341) (0.0437) (0.0441) (0.0529) (0.0545)
(β2)NoInsi,t 0.000185 -0.00484 -0.0127 -0.0118
(0.00407) (0.00724) (0.0101) (0.0138)
(β3)Eligi,t × NoInsi,t 0.0111 0.0286∗ 0.0511∗∗ 0.0642∗∗
(0.00898) (0.0146) (0.0216) (0.0290)
# Obs. 74505 74505 62556 62556 50595 50595 38638 38638
Adjusted R2 0.030 0.030 0.064 0.064 0.092 0.092 0.120 0.120
Un-Married
(β1)Eligi,t 0.0120 0.000793 0.0373
∗ 0.0187 0.0494∗ 0.0269 0.0571 0.0278
(0.0111) (0.0100) (0.0200) (0.0177) (0.0261) (0.0234) (0.0366) (0.0336)
(β2)NoInsi,t -0.000385 0.000540 0.00357 0.00990
(0.00311) (0.00563) (0.00729) (0.00962)
(β3)Eligi,t × NoInsi,t 0.0220∗∗ 0.0353∗∗ 0.0418∗∗ 0.0538∗∗
(0.00866) (0.0144) (0.0188) (0.0251)
# Obs. 43746 43746 36532 36532 29389 29389 22324 22324
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.019 0.036 0.038 0.051 0.054 0.072 0.076
Group FEs X X X X X X X X
Sample is restricted to females during reproductive age (15-44), who do not have an infant, are the only
reproductive female in the household at the time of first wave of the panels. There are a total of 28,221
unique females and a total of 174,752 person-wave observations. The group fixed effects include race,
full interactions between kid5 and kid17, year-month, state, full interaction between age and educ, state-
year. Eligi,t is the state-level eligibility calculated using Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) instrument.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
3.4.4 Group Fixed Effect: By Race
Next, we estimate the model by comparing between white and black racial groups. Since
in the sample American Indian and Asian groups only represent less than 3% of the sample, we
exclude them from the model. Still white categories constitute majority of the sample.
Table 3.5 reports the coefficient estimates. Comparing with 3.3, we see that the white cat-
egory represents the majority of the sample which is in line with the estimates pooling all races
together. However, it is particularly noteworthy that for the black category the Medicaid eligibility
does not seem to have a significant effect on fertility in the future. This is not only reflected by the
fact that the coefficient estimates are not significant for black categories, but also the fact that for
the white category the coefficient estimates have increased compared to Table 3.3.
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Table 3.5: Group Fixed Effect: By Race
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LHS = Birthi,t→t+h h = 4 h = 4 h = 8 h = 8 h = 12 h = 12 h = 16 h = 16
White
(β1)Eligi,t 0.00731 0.00192 0.0101 -0.00255 0.00692 -0.0128 0.0190 -0.00703
(0.00987) (0.00998) (0.0227) (0.0239) (0.0315) (0.0334) (0.0352) (0.0384)
(β2)NoInsi,t -0.00872∗∗∗ -0.0210∗∗∗ -0.0304∗∗∗ -0.0341∗∗∗
(0.00312) (0.00558) (0.00823) (0.0113)
(β3)Eligi,t × NoInsi,t 0.0182∗∗∗ 0.0425∗∗∗ 0.0643∗∗∗ 0.0839∗∗∗
(0.00663) (0.0127) (0.0203) (0.0296)
# Obs. 102928 102928 86277 86277 69653 69653 53079 53079
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.020 0.042 0.042 0.058 0.058 0.075 0.075
Black
(β1)Eligi,t -0.0131 -0.0222 -0.0253 -0.0367 -0.0286 -0.0357 -0.0609 -0.0696
(0.0325) (0.0354) (0.0656) (0.0731) (0.0837) (0.0991) (0.108) (0.122)
(β2)NoInsi,t 0.000579 0.000295 -0.00229 0.00158
(0.00857) (0.0158) (0.0233) (0.0291)
(β3)Eligi,t × NoInsi,t 0.0136 0.0170 0.0109 0.0122
(0.0171) (0.0314) (0.0520) (0.0618)
# Obs. 11502 11502 9616 9616 7757 7757 5913 5913
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.023 0.064 0.064 0.093 0.092 0.118 0.118
Group FEs X X X X X X X X
Sample is restricted to females during reproductive age (15-44), who do not have an infant, are the only repro-
ductive female in the household at the time of first wave of the panels. There are a total of 28,221 unique females
and a total of 174,752 person-wave observations. The group fixed effects include race, full interactions between
kid5 and kid17, year-month, state, full interaction between age and educ, state-year. Eligi,t is the state-level eli-
gibility calculated using Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) instrument.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
3.4.5 Group Fixed Effect By Education
We further investigate the effect of Medicaid expansion on fertility by breaking down the
sample into different categories according to education. Rather than including a dummy variable
in the regression, we estimate the full model separately on two sets of data, “no college education”
and “college or above”.
Table 3.6 reports the model coefficients for females with different level of education. On a
grand scheme, females, who have college or above education, without an alternative insurance and
without Medicaid eligibility, have significantly lower fertility. However, the same does not apply
for females with no college education. For females with college or above education, the effect of
Medicaid under no insurance has large magnitude of 12.7%
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Table 3.6: Group Fixed Effect: By Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LHS = Birthi,t→t+h h = 4 h = 4 h = 8 h = 8 h = 12 h = 12 h = 16 h = 16
No College Education
(β1)Eligi,t 0.0192 0.0155 0.0309 0.0222 0.0400 0.0294 0.0337 0.0187
(0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0267) (0.0276) (0.0378) (0.0387) (0.0490) (0.0502)
(β2)NoInsi,t -0.000773 -0.00508 -0.00571 -0.00822
(0.00379) (0.00705) (0.0102) (0.0142)
(β3)Eligi,t × NoInsi,t 0.00885 0.0209 0.0246 0.0359
(0.00753) (0.0143) (0.0217) (0.0313)
# Obs. 61529 61529 51608 51608 41690 41690 31801 31801
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.020 0.042 0.042 0.058 0.058 0.076 0.076
College or Above
(β1)Eligi,t -0.00271 -0.00525 -0.0113 -0.0171 -0.0295 -0.0433 -0.00276 -0.0250
(0.0166) (0.0167) (0.0306) (0.0313) (0.0443) (0.0455) (0.0532) (0.0557)
(β2)NoInsi,t -0.0104∗∗ -0.0223∗∗ -0.0402∗∗∗ -0.0465∗∗∗
(0.00442) (0.00849) (0.0108) (0.0152)
(β3)Eligi,t × NoInsi,t 0.0150 0.0336 0.0773∗ 0.127∗
(0.0147) (0.0305) (0.0444) (0.0642)
# Obs. 56722 56722 47480 47480 38294 38294 29161 29161
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.020 0.041 0.042 0.060 0.060 0.077 0.077
Group FEs X X X X X X X X
Sample is restricted to females during reproductive age (15-44), who do not have an infant, are the only re-
productive female in the household at the time of first wave of the panels. There are a total of 28,221 unique
females and a total of 174,752 person-wave observations. The group fixed effects include race, full interac-
tions between kid5 and kid17, year-month, state, full interaction between age and educ, state-year. Eligi,t is
the state-level eligibility calculated using Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) instrument.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
3.4.6 Group Fixed Effect: By Employment
We further investigate the effect of Medicaid expansion on fertility by breaking down the
sample into different categories according to employment status. Rather than including a dummy
variable in the regression, we estimate the full model separately on two sets of data, “Not em-
ployed” and “employed”.
Table 3.7 reports the coefficient estimated using the two sets of sample on employment.
As we can see that females who are not employed are more affected by the Medicaid insurance
eligibility under no insurance than female who are employed. The difference not only comes in
terms of statistical significance but also present in terms of the magnitude. The point estimates of
the β3 coefficients are 1.93%, 3.76% 5.98% and 8.61% respectively for 4,8,12,16 month horizons.
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Table 3.7: Group Fixed Effect: By Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LHS = Birthi,t→t+h h = 4 h = 4 h = 8 h = 8 h = 12 h = 12 h = 16 h = 16
Not Employed
(β1)Eligi,t -0.00278 -0.0129 -0.00930 -0.0292 -0.0309 -0.0633 -0.0213 -0.0694
(0.0198) (0.0206) (0.0409) (0.0461) (0.0524) (0.0568) (0.0674) (0.0732)
(β2)NoInsi,t -0.00996∗ -0.0191∗ -0.0289∗∗ -0.0355∗∗
(0.00558) (0.00970) (0.0110) (0.0151)
(β3)Eligi,t × NoInsi,t 0.0193∗ 0.0376∗ 0.0598∗∗ 0.0861∗∗
(0.0110) (0.0219) (0.0229) (0.0326)
# Obs. 39360 39360 33209 33209 26986 26986 20725 20725
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.032 0.060 0.061 0.075 0.076 0.093 0.094
Employed
(β1)Eligi,t 0.0118 0.0112 0.0184 0.0147 0.0273 0.0186 0.0397 0.0270
(0.00993) (0.0101) (0.0212) (0.0218) (0.0290) (0.0297) (0.0348) (0.0365)
(β2)NoInsi,t -0.00952∗∗∗ -0.0208∗∗∗ -0.0301∗∗∗ -0.0321∗∗∗
(0.00264) (0.00585) (0.00776) (0.0103)
(β3)Eligi,t × NoInsi,t 0.00247 0.0172 0.0395∗∗ 0.0576∗∗
(0.00552) (0.0123) (0.0189) (0.0259)
# Obs. 78891 78891 65879 65879 52998 52998 40237 40237
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.015 0.033 0.033 0.050 0.050 0.068 0.068
Group FEs X X X X X X X X
Sample is restricted to females during reproductive age (15-44), who do not have an infant, are the only repro-
ductive female in the household at the time of first wave of the panels. There are a total of 28,221 unique females
and a total of 174,752 person-wave observations. The group fixed effects include race, full interactions between
kid5 and kid17, year-month, state, full interaction between age and educ, state-year. Eligi,t is the state-level eli-
gibility calculated using Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) instrument.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
3.5 Robustness Checks
In this section, we perform a selection of robustness checks. We vary the methodology by
using individually imputed eligibility in place of the Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) instrument for
state level Medicaid eligibility. Also we employ the Cox (1972) survival model on individual level.
3.5.1 Group Fixed Effect: Imputed Eligibility
First we investigate if the results are sensitive to the choice of the Medicaid eligibility in-
struments. Previously, we used the Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) instrument for state-level Medicaid
eligibility, while in this section we use the individual level imputed eligibility ImpEligi,t according
to Barkowski (2014). We present the base case regression in Table 3.8 to compare against Table
3.3. As expected, Medicaid eligibility has significant effect on females who do not have alternative
insurance. The β3 term is significantly positive across all horizons. Notice that without controlling
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Table 3.8: Group Fixed Effect: Imputed Eligibility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
h = 4 h = 4 h = 8 h = 8 h = 12 h = 12 h = 16 h = 16
(β1)ImpEligi,t -0.00495
∗∗∗ -0.00935∗∗∗ -0.0119∗∗∗ -0.0196∗∗∗ -0.0196∗∗∗ -0.0288∗∗∗ -0.0256∗∗∗ -0.0382∗∗∗
(0.00105) (0.00116) (0.00189) (0.00198) (0.00265) (0.00312) (0.00320) (0.00425)
(β2)NoInsi,t -0.00433∗ -0.00787 -0.00597 -0.000212
(0.00252) (0.00486) (0.00673) (0.00888)
(β3)ImpEligi,t 0.0130
∗∗∗ 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.0245∗∗∗ 0.0278∗∗∗
×NoInsi,t (0.00250) (0.00538) (0.00791) (0.00953)
# Obs. 118251 118251 99088 99088 79984 79984 60962 60962
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.019 0.039 0.039 0.055 0.056 0.072 0.073
Group FEs X X X X X X X X
Sample is restricted to females during reproductive age (15-44), who do not have an infant, are the only re-
productive female in the household at the time of first wave of the panels. There are a total of 28,221 unique
females and a total of 174,752 person-wave observations. The group fixed effects include race, full interactions
between kid5 and kid17, year-month, state, full interaction between age and educ, state-year. Eligi,t is the
state-level eligibility calculated using Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) instrument.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
for the alternative insurance term, the estimate of the effect of Medicaid eligibility will be severely
biased.
3.5.2 Cox Survival Model
Finally, as an additional robustness check, we implement the Cox (1972) proportional haz-
ard model to investigate the women’s decisions to give birth.
One may view that giving birth to the first child is different from giving birth to another
child when the female already has given birth before; therefore, these two births should not be
treated equally. Moreover, one may also be concerned that females, who are never going to give
birth, represent significant portion of the population, as such their presence could affect the model
estimates in linear regression. In light of this, we construct a time2baby variable that tracks each
individual’s time till giving birth to a child in the sample. We use the Cox and Oakes (1984) method
to control for covariates. We keep only the females that given birth in the sample period.
We examine the survival function for a women to remain in the no-birth-yet category. Ta-
ble 3.9 reports the Cox proportional hazard model estimates for un-adjusted and adjusted for al-
ternative insurance. The results show that Medicaid eligibility seems to increase females fertility
(causing them to drop out of the “no-birth-yet” category faster). The point estimate for eligible for
Medicaid and without insurance is 3.63% although statistically insignificant.
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Figure 3.4: Survival Function
Figure 3.4 reports the survival function over time in units of four months for the un-
adjusted model and model controlled for insurance. Females who are eligible for Medicaid remain
in the “no-birth-yet” category shorter. By controlling for an alternative insurance, we see that the
group of female who are eligible and no insurance are remaining in the “no-birth-yet” category
even shorter, consistent with the previously reported estimate that Medicaid eligibility for those
who are not coverage by insurance has more effect in increasing female fertility.
It is worth noting that due to data limitations, we are only able to observe a consistent
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Table 3.9: Cox Proportional Hazard Estimate
(1) (2)
Model 1 Model 2
ImpEligi,t 0.0602
∗∗∗ 0.0325
(0.0137) (0.0218)
NoInsi,t 0.00811
(0.0179)
ImpEligi,t × NoInsi,t 0.0363
(0.0312)
Observations 32541 32541
Sample is restricted to females during reproductive age (15-44), who does not have
an infant, are the only reproductive female in the household, at the time of first wave
of the panels; ImpEligi,t is the individual-level eligibility calculated using Barkowski
(2014) approach.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
panel of female for only up to 8 panel waves. With only 8 observations, we are not able to estimate
the effect with a high level of statistical precision using the survival model.
3.6 Conclusion
In summary, we use individual level panel data with eligibility to Medicaid as well as an
alternative insurance coverage to investigate the effect of Medicaid expansion on fertility. By com-
paring a model without considering alternative insurance, we show that the presence of alternative
insurance interferes with the effect of Medicaid eligibility on female fertility. Specifically, without
controlling for insurance, one cannot conclude that Medicaid eligibility increases or decreases the
female fertility; however, after controlling for the presence of an alternative insurance, the females
who are eligible for Medicaid but have no alternative insurance increase their fertility significantly
over all horizons ranging 4,8,12, and 16 months. By separately estimating the models into different
demographic groups, we see that unmarried, white, with college or above education, not employed
females are more impacted by the Medicaid eligibility as a potential health care benefit.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Data Cleaning Details
I follow the general approach in cleaning the data as in Bolton and de Figueiredo (2017).
Since the dataset is very large, I take a conservative approach in data cleaning. In my analysis, I
remove observations that are prone to error, such as an individual changed gender or race, missing
service status and missing duty stations. I also restrict the sample to be only on full-time employees.
I also dropped offices which had less than 3 employees on average over the observed years.
A.2 Additional Tables and Figures
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Figure A.1: Distribution of Tiny Office Sizes
Figure A.2: Distribution of Office Sizes
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Table A.1: Female Supervisors & log(Basic Pay), All Service Status, 10% Data
(1) (2) Office Size Quartile
Office FE Ind. FE Size (1) Size (2) Size (3) Size (4)
(β1)FSupi,j,t−1 4.715
∗∗∗ 1.273∗∗∗ 3.774∗∗∗ 3.588∗∗∗ 4.403∗∗∗ 11.00∗∗∗
(0.425) (0.139) (0.406) (0.784) (1.335) (3.369)
(β2)FSupi,j,t−1 × Malei -10.99∗∗∗ -1.436∗∗∗ -9.490∗∗∗ -8.588∗∗∗ -10.69∗∗∗ -14.90∗∗∗
(0.616) (0.207) (0.548) (1.199) (2.398) (3.038)
(β3)Malei 9.788∗∗∗ — 10.86∗∗∗ 9.093∗∗∗ 8.093∗∗∗ 12.14∗∗∗
(0.358) — (0.314) (0.641) (1.154) (1.590)
(γ1)Agei,t−1 0.261
∗∗∗ — 0.226∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗
(0.0154) — (0.0195) (0.0216) (0.0286) (0.0417)
(γ2)Tenurei,t−1 1.647∗∗∗ 1.282∗∗∗ 1.869∗∗∗ 1.714∗∗∗ 1.423∗∗∗ 1.699∗∗∗
(0.0332) (0.0290) (0.0374) (0.0487) (0.0413) (0.0984)
(γ3)Tenure2i,t−1 -0.0196∗∗∗ -0.0301∗∗∗ -0.0213∗∗∗ -0.0215∗∗∗ -0.0161∗∗∗ -0.0213∗∗∗
(0.000856) (0.000327) (0.000961) (0.00123) (0.00100) (0.00254)
p(β1 + β2 = 0) 1.92e-42 0.277 2.12e-43 8.39e-08 0.000732 0.283
p(β2 + β3 = 0) 0.00511 — 0.00293 0.494 0.0601 0.105
R2Adj 0.724 0.702 0.705 0.723 0.759 0.729
#Obs 1334109 1334109 321137 335961 334387 342624
Ind. FE — X — — — —
Office FE X — X X X X
Race, OccGrp FE X — X X X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X X X X X
10% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clustered at the office level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.2: Female Supervisors & Propensity to Promote on Pay Grade, 10% Data
(1) (2) Office Size Quartile
Office FE Ind. FE Size (1) Size (2) Size (3) Size (4)
(β1)FSupi,j,t−1 0.272 -0.918 -1.107 0.948 -0.655 1.231
(0.589) (0.627) (1.125) (0.973) (1.303) (1.231)
(β2)FSupi,j,t−1 × Malei 0.663 2.528∗∗∗ 1.761 0.690 -1.071 0.210
(0.689) (0.857) (1.439) (1.285) (1.327) (1.416)
(β3)Malei 0.0188 — -0.415 0.689 1.010 -1.273
(0.450) — (0.865) (0.815) (0.755) (0.895)
(γ1)Agei,t−1 -0.489
∗∗∗ — -0.551∗∗∗ -0.368∗∗∗ -0.460∗∗∗ -0.536∗∗∗
(0.0531) — (0.0962) (0.107) (0.120) (0.112)
(γ2)Tenurei,t−1 -1.103∗∗∗ -0.937∗∗∗ -1.195∗∗∗ -1.010∗∗∗ -1.099∗∗∗ -1.067∗∗∗
(0.0719) (0.225) (0.140) (0.139) (0.146) (0.137)
(γ3)Tenure2i,t−1 0.0205∗∗∗ 0.0225∗∗∗ 0.0224∗∗∗ 0.0179∗∗∗ 0.0214∗∗∗ 0.0200∗∗∗
(0.00166) (0.00353) (0.00329) (0.00307) (0.00364) (0.00303)
p(β1 + β2 = 0) 0.0783 0.00585 0.553 0.0691 0.101 0.191
p(β2 + β3 = 0) 0.251 — 0.281 0.182 0.957 0.396
R2Adj 0.165 0.335 0.172 0.161 0.156 0.194
#Obs 97798 97798 33939 21835 19216 22808
Ind. FE — X — — — —
Office FE X — X X X X
Race, OccGrp FE X — X X X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X X X X X
Grade FE X X X X X X
Step FE X X X X X X
10% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clustered at the office level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.3: Female Supervisors & log(Basic Pay), Non-Supervisors, 100% Data
(1) (2) Office Size Quartile
Office FE Ind. FE Size (1) Size (2) Size (3) Size (4)
(β1)FSupi,j,t−1 5.437
∗∗∗ 2.128∗∗∗ 1.747∗∗∗ 6.616∗∗∗ 11.22∗∗∗ 14.57∗∗
(0.440) (0.0598) (0.170) (1.083) (2.342) (7.072)
(β2)FSupi,j,t−1 × Malei -11.25∗∗∗ -1.500∗∗∗ -3.355∗∗∗ -15.33∗∗∗ -18.17∗∗∗ -19.98∗∗∗
(0.723) (0.0943) (0.256) (1.219) (3.061) (4.002)
(β3)Malei 8.358∗∗∗ — 6.998∗∗∗ 10.68∗∗∗ 10.72∗∗∗ 12.35∗∗∗
(0.373) — (0.137) (0.535) (1.382) (1.935)
(γ1)Agei,t−1 0.262
∗∗∗ — 0.216∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(0.0105) — (0.00633) (0.0116) (0.0174) (0.0324)
(γ2)Tenurei,t−1 1.640∗∗∗ 1.454∗∗∗ 1.985∗∗∗ 1.736∗∗∗ 1.438∗∗∗ 1.593∗∗∗
(0.0226) (0.00848) (0.0145) (0.0308) (0.0315) (0.0685)
(γ3)Tenure2i,t−1 -0.0231∗∗∗ -0.0341∗∗∗ -0.0289∗∗∗ -0.0246∗∗∗ -0.0198∗∗∗ -0.0226∗∗∗
(0.000545) (0.000101) (0.000348) (0.000713) (0.000704) (0.00172)
p(β1 + β2 = 0) 3.34e-33 1.63e-18 5.28e-15 2.06e-13 0.0113 0.452
p(β2 + β3 = 0) 4.57e-10 — 2.85e-76 1.04e-09 0.0000201 0.000866
R2Adj 0.726 0.705 0.719 0.719 0.756 0.735
#Obs 13,153,420 13,153,420 3,117,388 3,255,052 3,370,187 3,410,793
Ind. FE — X — — — —
Office FE X — X X X X
Race, OccGrp FE X — X X X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X X X X X
100% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clustered at the office level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.4: Female Supervisors & log(Basic Pay), Supervisors, 100% Data
(1) (2) Office Size Quartile
Office FE Ind. FE Size (1) Size (2) Size (3) Size (4)
(β1)FSupi,j,t−1 4.919
∗∗∗ 3.160∗∗∗ 7.662∗∗∗ -0.100 -2.167 -7.018
(0.573) (0.151) (0.348) (1.385) (2.932) (12.54)
(β2)FSupi,j,t−1 × Malei -6.525∗∗∗ -2.906∗∗∗ -8.991∗∗∗ -4.763∗∗∗ 0.659 -0.164
(0.665) (0.194) (0.467) (1.077) (2.303) (2.244)
(β3)Malei 8.243∗∗∗ — 9.820∗∗∗ 7.221∗∗∗ 5.096∗∗∗ 5.312∗∗∗
(0.266) — (0.219) (0.429) (0.959) (0.922)
(γ1)Agei,t−1 0.411
∗∗∗ — 0.341∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗
(0.0157) — (0.0135) (0.0200) (0.0261) (0.0469)
(γ2)Tenurei,t−1 0.657∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗
(0.0328) (0.0175) (0.0331) (0.0441) (0.0661) (0.0775)
(γ3)Tenure2i,t−1 -0.00141∗∗ -0.0200∗∗∗ -0.00583∗∗∗ -0.000388 -0.00191 -0.0000817
(0.000561) (0.000246) (0.000697) (0.000889) (0.00129) (0.00129)
p(β1 + β2 = 0) 0.00184 0.0291 0.00000300 0.000216 0.584 0.558
p(β2 + β3 = 0) 0.000187 — 0.0174 0.000641 0.0000510 0.000563
R2Adj 0.541 0.685 0.469 0.509 0.599 0.603
#Obs 2592918 2592918 730869 694471 568375 599203
Ind. FE — X — — — —
Office FE X — X X X X
Race, OccGrp FE X — X X X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X X X X X
100% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clustered at the office level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.5: Female Supervisor History & log(Basic Pay), All Service Status, 100% Data
(1) (2) Office Size Quartile
Office FE Ind. FE Size (1) Size (2) Size (3) Size (4)
(β1)FSupHisti,j,t−1 5.335
∗∗∗ 5.007∗∗∗ 4.538∗∗∗ 4.984∗∗∗ 5.203∗∗∗ 4.467∗
(0.513) (0.128) (0.278) (0.861) (1.382) (2.386)
(β2)FSupHisti,j,t−1 × Malei -16.05∗∗∗ -3.899∗∗∗ -9.032∗∗∗ -18.62∗∗∗ -19.24∗∗∗ -19.71∗∗∗
(0.749) (0.188) (0.353) (1.063) (2.408) (3.022)
(β3)Malei 11.07∗∗∗ — 10.06∗∗∗ 12.52∗∗∗ 11.82∗∗∗ 12.85∗∗∗
(0.308) — (0.145) (0.425) (1.007) (1.364)
(γ1)Agei,t−1 0.266
∗∗∗ — 0.219∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗
(0.0115) — (0.00677) (0.0128) (0.0185) (0.0367)
(γ2)Tenurei,t−1 1.684∗∗∗ 1.408∗∗∗ 2.002∗∗∗ 1.780∗∗∗ 1.473∗∗∗ 1.665∗∗∗
(0.0238) (0.00808) (0.0153) (0.0306) (0.0310) (0.0774)
(γ3)Tenure2i,t−1 -0.0203∗∗∗ -0.0315∗∗∗ -0.0246∗∗∗ -0.0214∗∗∗ -0.0175∗∗∗ -0.0211∗∗∗
(0.000582) (0.0000938) (0.000356) (0.000692) (0.000687) (0.00194)
p(β1 + β2 = 0) 2.86e-78 1.28e-15 1.73e-44 7.26e-41 5.51e-13 0.000000672
p(β2 + β3 = 0) 2.99e-20 — 0.0000881 1.78e-17 0.000000570 0.000362
R2Adj 0.721 0.710 0.712 0.712 0.752 0.732
#Obs 16109577 16109577 3948016 4021001 4050616 4089944
Ind. FE — X — — — —
Office FE X — X X X X
Race, OccGrp FE X — X X X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X X X X X
100% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clustered at the office level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.6: Female Executive History and log(Basic Pay), All Service Status, 100% Data
(1) (2) Office Size Quartile
Office FE Ind. FE Size (1) Size (2) Size (3) Size (4)
(β1)FExecHisti,j,t−1 0.897∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗ 2.413∗∗∗ 0.909∗ 0.282 0.787
(0.359) (0.0585) (0.211) (0.481) (0.668) (1.141)
(β2)FExecHisti,j,t−1 × Malei -4.970∗∗∗ -0.903∗∗∗ -6.568∗∗∗ -4.799∗∗∗ -2.906∗∗∗ -4.317∗∗∗
(0.480) (0.0906) (0.258) (0.657) (1.018) (1.480)
(β3)Malei 6.274∗∗∗ — 8.718∗∗∗ 6.977∗∗∗ 4.579∗∗∗ 5.894∗∗∗
(0.226) — (0.114) (0.256) (0.379) (0.727)
(γ1)Agei,t−1 0.267
∗∗∗ — 0.218∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗
(0.0114) — (0.00676) (0.0128) (0.0186) (0.0362)
(γ2)Tenurei,t−1 1.685∗∗∗ 1.408∗∗∗ 2.003∗∗∗ 1.783∗∗∗ 1.472∗∗∗ 1.668∗∗∗
(0.0236) (0.00808) (0.0152) (0.0308) (0.0311) (0.0763)
(γ3)Tenure2i,t−1 -0.0202∗∗∗ -0.0315∗∗∗ -0.0246∗∗∗ -0.0213∗∗∗ -0.0173∗∗∗ -0.0209∗∗∗
(0.000582) (0.0000938) (0.000356) (0.000696) (0.000692) (0.00194)
p(β1 + β2 = 0) 1.75e-23 0.0250 2.37e-74 2.00e-11 0.00266 0.00893
p(β2 + β3 = 0) 0.00468 — 1.63e-22 0.000211 0.0497 0.225
R2Adj 0.720 0.710 0.712 0.711 0.751 0.731
#Obs 16105631 16105631 3944614 4020567 4050523 4089927
Ind. FE — X — — — —
Office FE X — X X X X
Race, OccGrp FE X — X X X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X X X X X
100% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clustered at the office level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.7: Female Supervisors & Propensity to Promote Into Supervisory Status, 10% Data
(1) (2) Office Size Quartile
Office FE Ind. FE Size (1) Size (2) Size (3) Size (4)
(β1)FSupi,j,t−1 1.77
∗∗∗ 0.946∗∗∗ 3.38∗∗∗ 0.333 0.0232 2.18
(0.492) (0.326) (0.705) (0.934) (1.18) (2.78)
(β2)FSupi,j,t−1 × Malei -7.67∗∗∗ -1.76∗∗∗ -11.6∗∗∗ -4.49∗∗∗ -2.34 -2.09
(0.689) (0.535) (0.893) (1.45) (1.96) (2.83)
(β3)Malei 4.95∗∗∗ — 6.48∗∗∗ 3.05∗∗∗ 2.27∗∗ 2.88∗∗
(0.380) — (0.514) (0.766) (1.03) (1.44)
(γ1)Agei,t−1 -0.131
∗∗∗ — -0.197∗∗∗ -0.0742∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(0.0140) — (0.0308) (0.0278) (0.0246) (0.0291)
(γ2)Tenurei,t−1 1.33∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗
(0.0409) (0.0425) (0.0583) (0.0627) (0.0622) (0.107)
(γ3)Tenure2i,t−1 -0.0211∗∗∗ -0.00642∗∗∗ -0.0241∗∗∗ -0.0183∗∗∗ -0.0174∗∗∗ -0.0252∗∗∗
(0.00110) (0.00755) (0.00178) (0.00181) (0.00177) (0.00258)
p(β1 + β2 = 0) 2.11e-25 0.0528 4.79e-30 0.000130 0.155 0.976
p(β2 + β3 = 0) 7.01e-10 — 5.94e-12 0.123 0.953 0.610
R2Adj 0.0938 0.132 0.111 0.0977 0.0842 0.0905
#Obs 1177390 1177390 264847 298260 306037 308246
Ind. FE — X — — — —
Office FE X — X X X X
Race, OccGrp FE X — X X X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X X X X X
10% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clustered at the office level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.8: Female Supervisors & Propensity to Exit, 10% Data
(1) Office Size Quartile
Office FE Size (1) Size (2) Size (3) Size (4)
(β1)FSupi,j,t−1 0.632 0.594
∗∗ 0.594 -0.998 6.341
(0.425) (0.254) (0.462) (0.660) (7.873)
(β2)FSupi,j,t−1 × Malei 0.0113 -0.232 -0.121 1.095∗ 0.249
(0.214) (0.290) (0.446) (0.588) (0.594)
(β3)Malei 0.219∗∗ 0.309∗∗ 0.424∗ -0.289 -0.0216
(0.109) (0.143) (0.221) (0.277) (0.327)
(γ1)Agei,t−1 0.176
∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.0116) (0.0188) (0.0220) (0.0228) (0.0236)
(γ2)Tenurei,t−1 -0.699∗∗∗ -0.703∗∗∗ -0.650∗∗∗ -0.706∗∗∗ -0.723∗∗∗
(0.0193) (0.0327) (0.0320) (0.0347) (0.0457)
(γ3)Tenure2i,t−1 0.0231∗∗∗ 0.0238∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗ 0.0230∗∗∗ 0.0237∗∗∗
(0.000553) (0.000951) (0.000957) (0.00107) (0.00125)
p(β1 + β2 = 0) 0.0840 0.178 0.327 0.890 0.389
p(β2 + β3 = 0) 0.102 0.747 0.285 0.0257 0.482
R2Adj 0.0538 0.0597 0.0499 0.0532 0.0573
#Obs 1030199 260197 252813 245242 271947
Office FE X X X X X
Race, OccGrp FE X X X X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X X X X
Grade FE X X X X X
Step FE X X X X X
10% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clustered at the office
level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.9: Female Supervisors & Propensity to Exit, Full Interactions, 10% Data
(1) Office Size Quartile
Office FE Size (1) Size (2) Size (3) Size (4)
(β1)FSupi,j,t 0.113 0.438 0.134 -3.751
∗∗∗ 6.087
(1.104) (0.787) (1.182) (1.428) (11.33)
(β2)GSi,t -0.0502∗∗∗ -0.0422∗∗∗ -0.0541∗∗∗ -0.0720∗∗∗ -0.0483∗∗
(0.00459) (0.00490) (0.00605) (0.00939) (0.0227)
(β3)Malei 2.771∗∗∗ 3.827∗∗∗ 1.988∗∗ 2.022∗ 3.135∗∗
(0.431) (0.623) (0.890) (1.077) (1.319)
(β4)FSupi,j,t × GSi,t 0.00879 0.00278 0.00789 0.0383∗∗ 0.0113
(0.00842) (0.00740) (0.0102) (0.0149) (0.0472)
(β5)FSupi,j,t × Malei -0.0794 -1.140 1.684 0.829 -0.895
(0.860) (1.256) (1.746) (2.160) (2.569)
(β6)GSi,t × Malei -0.0193∗∗∗ -0.0287∗∗∗ -0.0107 -0.0131 -0.0198
(0.00378) (0.00549) (0.00752) (0.00938) (0.0125)
(β7)FSupi,j,t -0.00581 0.00612 -0.0231 -0.0142 -0.00709×GSi,t × Malei (0.00791) (0.0112) (0.0155) (0.0191) (0.0268)
(γ1)Agei,t−1 0.165
∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.0117) (0.0188) (0.0223) (0.0225) (0.0253)
(γ2)Tenurei,t−1 -0.777∗∗∗ -0.796∗∗∗ -0.716∗∗∗ -0.817∗∗∗ -0.769∗∗∗
(0.0179) (0.0313) (0.0323) (0.0339) (0.0405)
(γ3)Tenure2i,t−1 0.0255∗∗∗ 0.0268∗∗∗ 0.0236∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗ 0.0252∗∗∗
(0.000538) (0.000936) (0.000971) (0.00106) (0.00116)
R2Adj 0.0504 0.0555 0.0472 0.0481 0.0552
#Obs 1030111 260156 252786 245231 271938
Office FE X X X X X
Race, OccGrp FE X X X X X
Educ, Age, Year FE X X X X X
10% data, Offices with size less than 3 are excluded; Standard Errors are clustered at the office level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Data Cleaning Details
I follow the general approach in cleaning the data as in Bolton and de Figueiredo (2017).
Since the dataset is very large, I take a conservative approach in data cleaning. In my analysis, I
remove observations that are prone to error, such as an individual changed gender or race, missing
service status and missing duty stations.
71
Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Data Cleaning Details
I follow the general approach in cleaning the data as in Barkowski (2014). the imputed
Medicaid eligibility follows Currie and Gruber (1996a,b); Cutler and Gruber (1996a); Gruber and
Yelowitz (1999); Gruber and Simon (2008), on the basis of observable data and detailed, state-level
eligibility rules. We use the program developed and used by Gruber and Yelowitz (1999). For
children, we impute the eligibility up to age of 20, which is the highest possible age a person could
be eligible as a child. We define the female of reproductive age to be between age of 15 to 44,
inclusive.
The following Figure C.1 depicts the sample sizes of each panel wave.
Figure C.1: Sizes of Panel Waves
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